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ABSTRACT




In any social structure, there is often a need to reach decisions, not only
within a group but between groups as well, sometimes even urgently so. Each of
the individuals constituting these groups has their own preference for the decision
to be made. We will discuss the problem of aggregating individual preferences into a
collective preference and under what conditions we are required to select a collective
majority. In this dissertation we will look at three models of consensus and show
the conditions vary based on the model.
v
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Why does majority rule need to be characterized? The goal of this thesis is
to provide an answer to this question. The focus will be on axiomatic or fairness
properties that a given voting rule may or may not satisfy.
The 2016 presidential election certainly left many American voters puzzled
when the winner had nearly 3 million fewer votes than the runner up. Certainly
the choice of method to choose an a alternative left many of the electorate feeling
as if the method violated some fairness criterion. In this light, we should choose the
method of selecting alternatives based on how ‘fair’ the method is. However, this
asks the question: “How fair can a method of choosing an alternative truly be?”.
To answer this question, consider the framework that we require every person
in the electorate to completely order the alternatives in terms of preference and
the rule selects a completely ordered ranking of the alternatives. A nice fairness
condition we consider in this framework is the condition of weak pareto which
states that if every member of the electorate prefers an alternative x to an alternative
y, then the rule should select a ranking of alternatives in which x is preferred to
y. Another condition is Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, which states
that if we’re trying to figure out whether a society prefers an alternative x to y,
what people think of the alternative z shouldn’t matter.
Both of these conditions seem very reasonable conditions for our rule to
satisfy, however according to Arrow’s Theorem [3], the only rule satisfying these
conditions is a dictatorship. Certainly this seems considerably more ‘un-fair’ than
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the situation of the 2016 presidential election. This is just one of many theorems in
the realm of mathematical social choice that demonstrates that there is no unani-
mously ‘fair’ voting rule to select a candidate from a list of alternatives.
To discuss a rule’s virtues and vices amounts to discussing its defining char-
acteristics, that is to say what properties characterizes a rule. For example, in 1952
Kenneth May [12] characterized simple majority rule in terms of anonymity, neu-
trality, and positive responsiveness. This implies that not only does simple majority
rule satisfy these three conditions, but that it is the only such rule satisfying these
conditions.
To this day, May’s Theorem is a well cited result in the social choice lit-
erature. Although the domain in his theorem is very ‘simple’, it paved the way
for many other characterization of majority rule on non-simple domains. However,
with larger more complex domains, we need more axioms to accomplish the same
goals of providing an axiomatic characterization of majority rule.
Young [16] proved that Borda’s rule is the only social choice function, defined
on profiles of linear orders, satisfying neutrality, consistency, faithfulness, and can-
cellation. Fishburn [8] extended Young’s theorem to the case where a social choice
function takes as input a ballot response profile and outputs a nonempty subset of
winning alternatives. Each voter submits a nonempty subset of alternatives called
a ballot and the set of all admissible ballots is called the ballot space. A voter’s
ballot consists of all approved alternatives. Fishburn proved that majority rule is
the only social choice function satisfying neutrality, consistency, faithfulness, and
cancellation. Alo´s-Ferrer [2] showed that the axiom of neutrality was not needed
for Fishburn’s theorem. Moreover, he was able to give a much simpler argument
than Fishburn’s original proof. This simplicity came at a price. Namely, Alo´s-
Ferrer assumed that the ballot space is the set of all proper subsets of the set of
alternatives.
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Following further down the path pioneered by May, in this dissertation we
will be characterizing majority rule on various discrete models of consensus. It
will be our goal to start with the most concrete model and work our way towards
the more general models. To do so we will be primarily working with the fairness
conditions of faithfulness, consistency, cancellation, neutrality, and non-deviating.
A consensus rule is faithful if the society of voters is made up of 1 voter and
that voter casts the ballot B then the rule should select that ballot as an output.
Consistency says that if an alternative x is an acceptable social outcome by two
disjoint groups of voters, then x should be an acceptable social outcome for the
union of the two groups. Moreover, if another alternative y is not an acceptable
outcome for one of the groups, then y should not be part of the social outcome
for the union of the two groups. If all alternatives get the same number of votes,
then cancellation implies that every alternative should belong to the social output.
Neutrality implies that the labeling of the alternatives does not affect the social
outcome. Finally the condition of non-deviating implies that if every alternative
receives the same approval in two different voting situations, then the rule should
select the same set of alternatives for each situation.
The first and least general mode of consensus that we will work with will be
the framework of Alo´s-Ferrer in which a member of an electorate can approve of any
set of alternatives. We will first provide an alternative proof to that of Alo´s-Ferrer
and then provide a more general result by characterizing majority rule with the
axioms of neutrality, consistency, faithfulness, and cancellation. Later we provide
arguments to show the necessity of each axiom in the characterization.
In Chapter 3 we work on a more general model in which members of an elec-
torate are more restricted in their approval and must choose a ballot of candidates
they most prefer. We begin by working with the framework introduced by Fishburn
in which the ballots are restricted by size. We later introduce a new model that
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is even more general. In this model we will present some of the main theorems of
this dissertation. In this chapter we will work with the axioms of faithfulness, con-
sistency and cancellation to show for which domains these three axioms uniquely
characterize majority rule.
We conclude the results of this dissertation in Chapter 4 by generalizing
some of the main results of this dissertation to the latticial1 framework introduced
by Monjardet [13]. We then finish the dissertation with some concluding remarks
followed by a discussion of the future of the work discussed in this dissertation.




Collective approval rules are well studied rules in mathematical social choice.
The most well known is the Approval Voting rule. In this chapter we will be
considering social choice functions where a “voter” may cast any ballot consisting
of whichever candidates (or alternatives) they approve of and the social outcome
for these rules will be a nonempty collection of candidates.
2.1 NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY
The finite set of alternatives is X = {x1, . . . , xm} with m ≥ 2. The set of all
subsets of X is denoted by P(X) and the sets belonging to P(X) are called ballots.
The set of natural numbers including 0 is denoted by N0. A function pi : P(X)→ N0
is called a ballot response profile or just simply a profile with the interpretation
that pi(B) represents the number of voters that chose the ballot B. The set of all
profiles on P(X) is given by N0P(X). Any function of the form
f : N0P(X) → Pne(X)
is called a collective approval rule or just simply a rule, where
Pne(X) = {A ∈ P(X) : A 6= ∅}.
A simple example of a collective approval rule that we will be studying is the rule
that outputs the entire set of alternatives for every profile. Alo´s-Ferrer [2] points
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out that such a rule is implicitly anonymous, meaning the names of the voters
cannot influence the result.
For any profile pi ∈ N0P(X) and for any alternative x ∈ X, the number of









1 if x ∈ B
0 otherwise.
The maximum and minimum approval values based on a profile pi are
max v(pi) = max{v(x, pi) : x ∈ X}
and
min v(pi) = min{v(x, pi) : x ∈ X}.
The approval voting rule is the rule FA : N0P(X) → Pne(X) defined as
follows: for any profile pi,
FA(pi) = {x ∈ X : v(x, pi) = max v(pi)}.
Notice that x ∈ FA(pi) means that there is no alternative y that obtained more votes
than x. Similarly, the inverse approval voting rule is the rule FA−1 : N0P(X) →
Pne(X) defined as follows: for any profile pi,
FA−1(pi) = {x ∈ X : v(x, pi) = min v(pi)}.
Notice that x ∈ FA−1(pi) means that there is no alternative y that obtained less
votes than x.
For profiles pi, pi′ we define the profile pi + pi′ by
(pi + pi′)(B) = pi(B) + pi′(B)
for all B ∈ P(X).
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Lemma 2.1. For any profiles pi, pi′ and for every alternative x ∈ X,
v(x, pi + pi′) = v(x, pi) + v(x, pi′).
Proof. To show this, let pi, pi′ ∈ N0P(X) be any arbitrary profiles, and let x ∈ X.
Then















= v(x, pi) + v(x, pi′).
Hence v(x, pi + pi′) = v(x, pi) + v(x, pi′) as was desired.
A rule f is said to satisfy consistency (or f is said to be consistent) if for
any profiles pi, pi′ ∈ N0P(X),
f(pi) ∩ f(pi′) 6= ∅ ⇒ f(pi + pi′) = f(pi) ∩ f(pi′).
Consistency implies that if an alternative x is an acceptable social outcome by two
disjoint groups of voters, then x should be an acceptable social outcome for the
union of the two groups. Moreover, if another alternative y is not an acceptable
outcome for one of the groups, then y should not be part of the social outcome for
the union of the two groups. We now show that the approval voting rule satisfies
consistency.
Proposition 2.2. The approval voting rule satisfies the condition of consistency.
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be profiles such that FA(pi) ∩ FA(pi′) 6= ∅. To show
FA(pi) ∩ FA(pi′) ⊆ FA(pi + pi′),
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let x ∈ FA(pi)∩FA(pi′). Thus v(x, pi) ≥ v(y, pi) and v(x, pi′) ≥ v(y, pi′) for all y ∈ X.
Observe that:
v(x, pi + pi′) = v(x, pi) + v(x, pi′)
≥ v(y, pi) + v(y, pi′) ∀ y ∈ X
= v(y, pi + pi′),
thus x ∈ FA(pi + pi′). Now to show
FA(pi) ∩ FA(pi′) ⊇ FA(pi + pi′),
let z ∈ FA(pi + pi′). Thus v(z, pi + pi′) = v(z, pi) + v(z, pi′). If z ∈ FA(pi) ∩ FA(pi′) we
are done. Then we may assume that z /∈ FA(pi). Choose y ∈ FA(pi) ∩ FA(pi′) such
that v(z, pi) < v(y, pi) and so, v(y, pi)− v(z, pi) > 0. Given v(z, pi+pi′) ≥ v(y, pi+pi′)
for all y ∈ X it follows that:
v(z, pi) + v(z, pi′) ≥ v(y, pi) + v(y, pi′)
v(z, pi′) ≥ (v(y, pi)− v(z, pi)) + v(y, pi′)
v(z, pi′) > v(y, pi′) since v(y, pi)− v(z, pi) > 0
contrary to y ∈ FA(pi′). Hence it follows that FA(pi) ∩ FA(pi′) ⊇ FA(pi + pi′). Thus
FA(pi)∩FA(pi′) = FA(pi+pi′) and hence the approval voting rule satisfies consistency.
Example of rules we can consider that are not consistent is the class of mean
based rules studied by Duddy and Piggins [6]. For any profile pi, the mean approval
of pi is





An example of a mean based rule is Fmean : N0P(X) → Pne(X) defined by: for all
profiles pi
Fmean(pi) = {x ∈ X : v(x, pi) ≥ v(pi)}.
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To see that the rule Fmean is not consistent, consider the following example:
Example 2.1. The set of alternatives is X = {x1, x2, x3}. pi is a profile where two
voters approve of the alternative x1, four voters approve of the alternative x2, and
three voters approve of the alternative x3. pi
′ is a profile where four voters approve of
the alternative x1, two voters approve of the alternative x2, and three voters approve
of the alternative x3. The mean approvals of pi and pi
′ are v(pi) = 3 and v(pi′) = 3.
Thus Fmean(pi) = {x2, x3} and Fmean(pi′) = {x1, x3}. Since both outputs have a
commonly selected alternative, consistency would imply that Fmean(pi + pi
′) = {x3}.
Consider the profile pi+pi′. In this profile there are eighteen voters approving of each
of the three alternatives. Hence v(pi′) = 6 and thus Fmean(pi + pi′) = {x1, x2, x3}. It
follows that Fmean is not a consistent rule.
For any ballot B ∈ P(X), the profile where one voter chooses B is denoted
by piB, so piB(B) = 1 and piB(B
′) = 0 for all B′ 6= B. A rule f satisfies faithfulness
(or f is said to be faithful) if, for all nonempty ballots B,
f (piB) = B.
If there is just one voter and that voter submits the ballot B which is not the empty
set, then faithfulness implies that the social outcome should be B. This is a very
natural assumption we would like a rule to satisfy since if there is only one ballot
to aggregate into a nonempty subset of alternatives, then it should simply be that
ballot. An example of a rule that is not faithful would be the constant function
which selects the entire set of alternatives for every possible profile.
Proposition 2.3. The approval voting rule satisfies the condition of faithfulness.
Proof. To show that the approval voting rule satisfies faithfulness, let B ∈ P(X)
which is nonempty. Consider piB. Since max v(pi) = 1, and v(x, pi) = 1 if and only
if x ∈ B, it follows that FA (piB) = B and hence the approval voting rule satisfies
faithfulness.
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A rule f satisfies cancellation (or f is said to be cancellative) if, for any
pi ∈ N0P(X),
v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) for all x, y ∈ X ⇒ f(pi) = X.
That is to say, if all alternatives get the same number of votes, then cancellation
implies that every alternative should belong to the social output.
Proposition 2.4. The approval voting rule satisfies the condition of cancellation.
Proof. We will consider a profile pi such that v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) for all x, y ∈ X.
Observe that since each of the alternatives received the same number of approvals,
v(x, pi) = max v(pi) for every alternative x ∈ X. By the definition of approval
voting it follows that
FA(pi) = X
and hence approval voting satisfies the condition of cancellation.
To understand the role of cancellation in characterizing approval voting, we
consider a refinement of approval voting. Define Fw : N0P(X) → Pne(X) by






Notice that Fw(pi) ⊆ FA(pi) for any profile pi, hence we say Fw is a refinement of
approval voting. If X = {x1, x2, x3} and pi = pi{x1} + pi{x2,x3}, then FA(pi) = X.
Notice that w(x1, pi) = 1, and w(x2, pi) = w(x3, pi) = 2. Thus Fw(pi) = {x1}. Thus
the rule Fw is not cancellative.
A permutation on X is a bijective function σ : X → X. For each B ∈ P(X)
we use the notation σ[B] to denote the image of B under the permutation σ. For
example if B = {x1, x2}, and σ = (x2 x3) then
σ[B] = σ[{x1, x2}] = {σ[x1], σ[x2]} = {x1, x3}.
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A rule f satisfies neutrality (or f is said to be neutral) if, for any profiles pi and
pi′ and for any permutation σ of X,
pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X) ⇒ σ [f(pi)] = f(pi′).
In this case we denote the profile pi′ as σ[pi]. Hence f satisfies neutrality if and only
if f (σ[pi]) = σ[f(pi)] for all profiles pi and for all permutations σ of X. Neutrality
implies that the labeling of the alternatives does not affect the social outcome.
Before we can show that approval voting is neutral, we first introduce a
lemma.
Lemma 2.5. If pi and pi′ are two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈
P(X) then v(x, pi) = v(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X.
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X).














Hence v(x, pi) = v(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X.
Proposition 2.6. The approval voting rule satisfies the condition of neutrality.
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X).
Then by Lemma 2.5 it follows that v(x, pi) = v(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X. Now consider
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that:
x ∈ FA(pi) ⇐⇒ v(x, pi) ≥ v(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ X
⇐⇒ v(σ[x], pi′) ≥ v(σ[y], pi′) ∀y ∈ X by Lemma 2.5
⇐⇒ σ(x) ∈ FA(pi′)
Thus the approval voting rule satisfies neutrality.
To consider a rule which is not neutral, we give a different refinement of
approval voting. Consider the rule
min(FA) : N0P(X) → Pne(X)
defined by: for all profiles pi
min(FA)(pi) = min FA(pi)
where
min FA(pi) = {xi : xi ∈ FA(pi) and i < j ∀ xj ∈ FA(pi) \ {xi}}.
Notice that min FA(pi) is the unique element belong to the approval voting output






















and thus the rule min(FA) is not neutral.
The last well studied condition we will discuss is the condition of non-
deviating. A rule f is said to satisfy the condition of non-deviating (or f is
said to be non-deviating) if pi and pi′ are profiles such that v(x, pi) = v(x, pi′)
for every alternative x ∈ X then f(pi) = f(pi′). If every alternative receives the
same approval in two separate societies then the rule should select the same social
outcome for each of the societies.
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Proposition 2.7. The approval voting rule satisfies the condition of non-deviating.
Proof. To show that approval voting satisfies the condition of non-deviating, let pi
and pi′ be two profiles such that v(x, pi) = v(x, pi′) for all x ∈ X. Then max v(pi) =
max v(pi′) and FA(pi) = FA(pi′) by the definition of approval voting. Thus approval
voting rule satisfies the condition of non-deviating.
The conditions of consistency, faithfulness, cancellation, neutrality and non-
deviating were introduce in the 1970s and dealt with by authors such as Smith [15],
Young [16], Fine and Fine [7], Fishburn [9], and Xu [11]. Finally, we will consider
a less studied condition. Introduced by Duddy and Piggins [6], the condition of
discerning is relatively new to the social choice literature.
A rule f is said to be discerning if for all profiles pi and all x ∈ X,
i) If v(x, pi) > v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x} then x ∈ f(pi).
ii) If v(x, pi) < v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x} then x /∈ f(pi).
The first condition implies that if there is an alternative which is approved of more
than any other alternative, then that alternative should be included in the social
outcome. The second condition implies that if there is an alternative which is
approved of less than any other alternative, then that alternative should not be
included in the social outcome.
Proposition 2.8. The approval voting rule is discerning.
Proof. To show that approval voting is discerning, consider a profile pi such that
v(x, pi) > v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x}. Thus v(x, pi) = max v(pi), hence it follows by
definition of approval voting that x ∈ FA(pi).
Now consider a profile pi such that v(x, pi) < v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \{x}. Thus
v(x, pi) 6= max v(pi), hence it follows by definition of FA that x /∈ FA(pi). Hence the
approval voting rule is discerning.
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2.2 THREE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF APPROVAL VOTING
For any profile pi, let
Null(pi) = {x ∈ X : v(x, pi) = 0}.
A profile pi is said to be trivial if Null(pi) = X. Examples of such profiles include
the profile generated by no voters and profiles generated by voters only approving
of the empty set of alternatives. We first consider the social output of these profiles.
Lemma 2.9. If ρ is a trivial profile and a rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies
faithfulness, consistency, and is non-deviating then f(ρ) = X.
Proof. By way of contradiction we will suppose that f(ρ) 6= X. Since f(ρ) 6= ∅, let

























a contradiction. Thus we have that f(ρ) = X as was desired.
Now we can state our first characterization of approval voting.
Theorem 2.10. A rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies faithfulness, consistency, and
is non-deviating if and only if f is the approval voting rule.
Proof. We have shown that the approval voting rule satisfies faithfulness, consis-
tency, and the non-deviating condition. It is left to show that approval voting is the
only rule satisfying these conditions. So let f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfy faithful-
ness, consistency, and the condition of non-deviating. We will show f(pi) = FA(pi)
for all possible profiles pi ∈ N0P(X).
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First let pi ∈ N0P(X) be a trivial profile. By Lemma 2.9, we have that f(pi) =
X which coincides with approval voting. Now let pi ∈ N0P(X) be any fixed nontrivial
profile. Since pi is nontrivial, the integer ` = max v(pi) is strictly greater than 0.
For each integer j in the interval [1, `] let
Bj = {x ∈ X : j ≤ v(x, pi)}.
Observe that
B1 = X \Null(pi) and B` = FA(pi).
Also notice that
Bj1 ⊆ Bj2 if j1 ≥ j2.
Now construct a new profile pi∗ as follows:




+ piB2 + · · ·+ piB`
)















Bj = B` 6= ∅










Thus f(pi∗) = FA(pi).
For each x ∈ X \ Null(pi), x ∈ Bj if and only if j = 1, 2, . . . , v(x, pi) and
so v(x, pi∗) = v(x, pi). Since f is non-deviating, we have that f(pi∗) = f(pi). Hence
f(pi) = FA(pi) and we’re done.
Now we will consider the role of cancellation in characterizing approval vot-
ing.
Lemma 2.11. If f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies consistency and cancellation, then
f is non-deviating.
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Proof. Let f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) be a rule satisfying consistency and cancellation.
Let pi and pi′ be profiles such that v(x, pi) = v(x, pi′) for all x ∈ X. For each
alternative xi ∈ X, let
`i = max v(pi)− v(xi, pi) ≥ 0.





Now consider that for the profile pi + ρ, we have that for each x ∈ X,
v(x, pi + ρ) = v(x, pi) + v(x, ρ)
= v(x, pi) + max v(pi)− v(x, pi)
= max v(pi).
Thus it follows by cancellation that f(pi + ρ) = X. Now consider the profile pi′ + ρ.
Since v(x, pi) = v(x, pi′) for all x ∈ X, we have that
v(x, pi′ + ρ) = v(x, pi′) + v(x, ρ)
= v(x, pi) + max v(pi)− v(x, pi)
= max v(pi).
Thus it follows by cancellation that f(pi′ + ρ) = X.
Now notice by consistency we have that
f(pi + pi′ + ρ) = f(pi) ∩X = f(pi)
since f(pi′ + ρ) = X. Similarly since f(pi + ρ) = X we have
f(pi′ + pi + ρ) = f(pi′) ∩X = f(pi′).
Since the operation of profile addition is commutative, we have that
f(pi) = f(pi + pi′ + ρ) = f(pi′ + pi + ρ) = f(pi′)
and thus f is non-deviating.
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We now state the characterization of approval voting given by Alo´s-Ferrer
[2] and observe that it is a consequence of Theorem 2.10 and Lemma 2.11.
Theorem 2.12 (Alo´s-Ferrer 2006). A rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies faithful-
ness, consistency, and cancellation if and only if f is the approval voting rule.
Our goal now is to provide a new characterization of approval voting using
the condition of discerning. As a first step toward this goal we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.13. If f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies neutrality, consistency, and is
discerning, then for any non-trivial profile pi,
Null(pi) ∩ f(pi) = ∅.
Proof. By way of contradiction, we will suppose there exists y ∈ Null(pi) ∩ f(pi).
If |Null(pi)| = 1 then we have a contradiction to discerning, so we may assume
|Null(pi)| ≥ 2. Let σ = (y x) for x ∈ Null(pi) \ {y}, and define a new profile pi′ as
follows; pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X). Notice that pi = pi′ and so by neutrality;
f(pi) = f(pi′) = σ[f(pi)].
Since x was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that Null(pi) ⊆ f(pi). Suppose
Null(pi) = {y, x1, x2, . . . , xj}. Since pi is nontrivial there exists z ∈ X \ Null(pi).
Define σi = (z xi) for xi ∈ {x1, . . . , xj} = Null(pi) \ {y}. For each σi define
a new profile pii as follows: pii(σi[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X). By neutrality,
y = σi(y) ∈ f(pii) for each i. Hence it follows by consistency that






= f(pi + pi1 + pi2 + · · ·+ pij)
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Now consider that:
v(t, pi + pi1 + · · ·+ pij) =

0 if t = y
v(z, pi) if t ∈ {z} ∪Null(pi) \ {y}
(j + 1) · v(t, pi) otherwise.
But v(y, pi + pi1 + · · · + pij) < v(x, pi + pi1 + · · · + pij) for all x ∈ X \ {y}. Hence by
discerning y /∈ f(pi + pi1 + pi2 + · · · + pij) a contradiction, and so the assumption of
y ∈ Null(pi) ∩ f(pi) is false. Hence
Null(pi) ∩ f(pi) = ∅.
as was desired.
When considering a profile such as piB we now know that, under the condi-
tions in the previous lemma, f(piB) ⊆ B. Now we will show when f(piB) = B.
Lemma 2.14. If f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies neutrality, consistency, and is
discerning then f is faithful.
Proof. Let B ∈ Pne(X). By Lemma 2.13 we have that f(piB) ⊆ B; in addition we
have f(piB) 6= ∅. First we will consider that |B| = 1. We may assume that B = {x}
for some x ∈ X. It follows from above we have that f(pi{x}) = {x} and we are done.
We now consider that |B| > 1. Let x ∈ B such that x ∈ f(piB). Consider
the permutation σ = (x y) for any y ∈ B \ {x}. Let pi′ be the profile defined by
pi′(σ[C]) = piB(C) for all C ∈ P(X). Hence piB = pi′ and thus f(piB) = f(pi′). By
neutrality we have that;
σ[f(piB)] = f(pi
′) = f(piB).
Thus it follows that y = σ(x) ∈ f(piB). Since y was chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that f(piB) = B.
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We now state our final characterization of approval voting as a consequence
of Theorem 2.12 and Lemma 2.14.
Theorem 2.15. A rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies neutrality, consistency,
cancellation, and is discerning if and only if f is the approval voting rule.
2.3 INDEPENDENCE OF AXIOMS
In the previous section, we characterized the approval voting rule with 3
conditions in Theorem 2.10, then using that characterization we expanded our con-
ditions going to Theorem 2.12 then finally to Theorem 2.15. At first it may seem
like the final characterization is a less concise or noteworthy characterization than
the first or even the second. In fact, it may appear that not all the conditions in
Theorem 2.15 are necessary to characterize approval voting. However, for each of
the four conditions we will provide a rule violating that condition, but satisfying
the other three.
First we will discuss the independence of neutrality in the characterization
of approval voting in Theorem 2.15. Let |X| ≥ 3 and suppose ≤ is a linear order
on X. For any subset Y ⊆ X, let min(Y ) be the unique element belonging to Y




X if FA(pi) = X
{min (FA(pi))} otherwise.
Proposition 2.16. The rule g satisfies consistency.
Proof. Suppose pi and pi′ are profiles such that g(pi)∩g(pi′) 6= ∅. If g(pi) = g(pi′) = X,
then g(pi + pi′) = X and thus g(pi) ∩ g(pi′) = g(pi + pi′).
Now suppose g(pi)∩g(pi′) 6= X, then without loss of generality we may assume
g(pi) 6= X. Thus g(pi) = {u} where u = min(FA(pi)). Observe that g(pi) ⊆ FA(pi)
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for all pi. So,
u ∈ g(pi) ∩ g(pi′) ⊆ FA(pi) ∩ FA(pi′) = FA(pi + pi′).
Since u ∈ FA(pi + pi′) it follows that z ≤ u where z = min (FA(pi + pi′)).
Also consider that z ∈ FA(pi + pi′) implies that z ∈ FA(pi) ∩ FA(pi′). In particular,
z ∈ FA(pi) and so u ≤ z, hence u = z. It follows that g(pi + pi′) = {z} = {u} =
g(pi) = g(pi) ∩ g(pi′) and hence the rule g satisfies consistency.
Proposition 2.17. The rule g is discerning.
Proof. Suppose pi is a profile such that v(x, pi) > v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
Then by definition of the approval voting rule, FA(pi) = {x}. Hence it follows that
g(pi) = min(FA(pi)) = min({x}) = {x}.
Now suppose that pi is a profile such that v(x, pi) < v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X\{x}.
Then by definition of the approval voting rule, x /∈ FA(pi). Consider that g(pi) ⊆
FA(pi). Since x /∈ FA(pi) it follows that x /∈ g(pi). Thus the rule g is discerning.
Proposition 2.18. The rule g satisfies cancellation.
Proof. Suppose pi is a profile such that v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) for all x, y ∈ X. Since
approval voting satisfies cancellation, FA(pi) = X. It follows that g(pi) = X. Hence
the rule g satisfies cancellation.
Proposition 2.19. The rule g does not satisfy neutrality.
Proof. By way of contradiction suppose that g satisfies neutrality. Let x1, x2 be two
alternatives such that x1 ≤ x2. Consider the profile pi{x1,x2} and the permutation













= {x1} contrary to assumption that g satisfies
neutrality.
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We will now show that the discerning condition can not be dropped from
Theorem 2.15. Consider the function fX : N0P(X) → Pne(X) defined by
fX(pi) = X.
Since every alternative is always in the social output, it is trivial that fX is con-
sistent, neutral and cancellative. We now show that fX violates the discerning
condition.
Proposition 2.20. The rule fX is not discerning.
Proof. Let pi be a profile such that v(x, pi) < v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X\{x}. By definition
of fX , x ∈ fX(pi). Hence fX is not discerning.
The next condition we will discuss the independence of in the characterization
of approval voting in Theorem 2.15 is consistency. Recall the function we defined
in Section 2.1, Fmean : N0P(X) → Pne(X) defined by
Fmean(pi) = {x ∈ X : v(x, pi) ≥ v(pi)}
where





Proposition 2.21. The rule Fmean satisfies faithfulness.
Proof. For B ∈ P(X) with B 6= ∅ consider the profile piB. If x ∈ B then v(x, piB) = 1,




It follows from the definition of Fmean that Fmean (piB) = B and thus Fmean satisfies
faithfulness.
Proposition 2.22. The rule Fmean is discerning.
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Proof. Suppose pi is a profile such that v(x, pi) > v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x}. We
first show that,
v(x, pi) = max v(pi) > v(pi).













By definition of v(pi) we have that
v(x, pi) = max v(pi) > v(pi).
Therefore, by the definition of Fmean, x ∈ Fmean(pi). Now consider the case that pi
is a profile such that v(x, pi) < v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x}. By a similar argument
we have that
v(x, pi) = min v(<)v(pi)
and thus it follows that x /∈ Fmean(pi). Thus Fmean is discerning.
Proposition 2.23. The rule Fmean satisfies neutrality.
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X).
Then by Lemma 2.5 it follows that v(x, pi) = v(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X and thus it
follows that v(pi) = v(pi′). Therefore,
x ∈ Fmean(pi) ⇐⇒ v(x, pi) ≥ v(pi)
⇐⇒ v(σ[x], pi′) ≥ v(pi′)
⇐⇒ σ(x) ∈ Fmean(pi′)
Thus, the rule Fmean satisfies neutrality.
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Proposition 2.24. The rule Fmean satisfies cancellation.











Since v(x, pi) = v(pi) it follows that Fmean(pi) = X. Hence Fmean satisfies cancella-
tion.
We showed in Example 2.1 that Fmean is not consistent when |X| = 3. The
next proposition shows that this example can be extended to the case where |X| ≥ 3.
Proposition 2.25. If |X| ≥ 3, then Fmean is not consistent.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume Fmean is consistent. Suppose |X| = n ≥ 3
and pi, pi′ are profiles such that
v(x, pi) =

2 + (n− 3) if x = x1
4 + (n− 3) if x = x2




4 + (n− 3) if x = x1
2 + (n− 3) if x = x2
3 + (n− 3) otherwise.
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Since v(x, pi + pi′) = v(x, pi) + v(x, pi′) for all x ∈ X. It follows that
v(x, pi + pi′) =

6 + 2(n− 3) if x = x1
6 + 2(n− 3) if x = x2
6 + 2(n− 3) otherwise.
Given that v(pi) = v(pi′) = n, and v(pi+pi′) = 2n. It follows that Fmean(pi+pi′) = X.
Since
Fmean(pi) ∩ Fmean(pi′) = X \ {x1, x2}
it follows that Fmean(pi + pi
′) 6= Fmean(pi) ∩ Fmean(pi′). Hence Fmean is not consistent.
The last condition we will discuss the independence of in the characterization
of approval voting in Theorem 2.15 is cancellation. Recall the rule Fw : N0P(X) →
Pne(X) defined in Section 2.1 by






We showed this rule violated cancellation; we will now show it satisfies the conditions
of neutrality, consistency, and discerning.
Proposition 2.26. If pi and pi′ are two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all
B ∈ P(X) then w(x, pi) = w(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X.
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X).
















Hence w(x, pi) = w(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X.
Proposition 2.27. The rule Fw satisfies neutrality.
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X).
Then, by Lemma 2.5, it follows that v(x, pi) = v(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X. Similarly
it follows from Proposition 2.26 that w(x, pi) = w(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X. Also note
that Fw(pi) ⊆ FA(pi) for all pi. Since y ∈ FA(pi) if and only if σ[y] ∈ FA(pi′), we have
x ∈ Fw(pi) ⇐⇒ w(x, pi) ≤ w(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ FA(pi)
⇐⇒ w(σ[x], pi′) ≤ w(σ[y], pi′) ∀ σ[y] ∈ FA(pi′) by Proposition 2.26
⇐⇒ σ(x) ∈ Fw(pi′).
Thus the rule Fw satisfies neutrality.
Proposition 2.28. The rule Fw satisfies consistency.
Proof. Let Fw(pi) ∩ Fw(ρ) 6= ∅. To show Fw(pi) ∩ Fw(ρ) ⊆ Fw(pi + ρ), let x ∈
Fw(pi) ∩ Fw(ρ).
Since Fw(pi) ⊆ FA(pi) for all pi, and since FA satisfies consistency, x ∈ FA(pi)∩
FA(ρ) = FA(pi + ρ). So it is left to show that w(x, pi + ρ) ≤ w(y, pi + ρ) for all
25
y ∈ FA(pi + ρ).
w(x, pi + ρ) = w(x, pi) + w(x, ρ)
≤ w(y, pi) + w(y, ρ)
= w(y, pi + ρ).
Hence it follows by definition of Fw, that x ∈ Fw(pi + ρ).
Now to show Fw(pi) ∩ Fw(ρ) ⊇ Fw(pi + ρ), let z ∈ Fw(pi + ρ). If z ∈ Fw(pi) ∩
Fw(ρ) we are done. Then we may assume that z /∈ Fw(pi). Choose y ∈ Fw(pi)∩Fw(ρ).
Then w(z, pi) > w(y, pi) and so w(z, pi)−w(y, pi) > 0. Given w(z, pi+ρ) ≤ w(y, pi+ρ)
for all y ∈ X it follows that:
w(z, pi) + w(z, ρ) ≤ w(y, pi) + w(y, ρ)
w(z, pi)− w(y, pi) + w(z, ρ) ≤ w(y, ρ)
w(z, ρ) < w(y, ρ) since w(z, pi)− w(y, pi) > 0
contrary to y ∈ Fw(ρ). Hence it follows that Fw(pi) ∩ Fw(ρ) ⊇ Fw(pi + ρ). Thus
Fw(pi) ∩ Fw(ρ) = Fw(pi + ρ) and so Fw satisfies consistency.
Proposition 2.29. The rule Fw is discerning.
Proof. Let pi ∈ N0P(X) be a profile such that v(x, pi) > v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
By definition of Fw, Fw(pi) = {x} hence x ∈ Fw(pi).
Now suppose that v(x, pi) < v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x}. Then by definition
of approval voting, it follows that x /∈ FA(pi) and thus x /∈ Fw(pi). Hence the rule
Fw is discerning.
The rules g, fX , Fmean, and Fw allow us to make the following statement.
Corollary 2.30. If |X| ≥ 3, then the conditions of neutrality, discerning, con-
sistency, and cancellation are necessary and sufficient in the characterization of
approval voting rule stated in Theorem 2.15.
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2.4 APPROVAL VOTING WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES
By Corollary 2.30, we know that if |X| ≥ 3, then the conditions of neutrality,
consistency, cancellation, and discerning are necessary and sufficient. Observe that
since f(pi) 6= ∅, if |X| = 1, then no conditions are required to characterize approval
voting, since it is the only function. This raises the question: under what minimal
set of conditions can we characterize approval voting when |X| = 2?
Theorem 2.31. For |X| = 2, a rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies cancellation
and is discerning if and only if f is the approval voting rule. Furthermore, the
conditions of cancellation and discerning are sufficient to characterize the approval
voting rule.
Proof. We have shown that the approval voting rule satisfies the conditions of can-
cellation and is discerning. We will now show it is the only rule satisfying these two
conditions.
Let X = {x1, x2}, and consider that for any profile pi ∈ N0P(X), we have three
cases. The first case is that v(x1, pi) = v(x2, pi), in this case f = X by cancellation,
and thus agrees with the approval voting rule. The next case is that v(x1, pi) >
v(x2, pi), hence by discerning we have that x1 ∈ f(pi) and x2 /∈ f(pi), and again the
rule f agrees with the approval voting rule. The last case is v(x1, pi) < v(x2, pi), we
have that f agrees with approval voting by a similar argument to the previous case.
Therefore, it follows that a rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies cancellation and is
discerning if and only if f is the approval voting rule.
To show this characterization is sufficient, recall the rule g : N0P(X) → Pne(X)
defined in section 2.3 by
g(pi) =

X if FA(pi) = X
{min (FA(pi))} otherwise.
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We showed that this rule is discerning but violated the condition of cancel-
lation. Also recall the rule fX defined in section 2.3 by fX(pi) = X for all profiles pi.
We showed that this rule satisfies the condition of cancellation but is not discerning.
Hence the conditions of cancellation and discerning are sufficient to characterize the
approval voting rule.
We have now shown that there are two necessary and sufficient conditions to
characterize approval voting. However, there is no other set of two conditions that
can characterize the approval voting rule. To see this, consider the following figure
that demonstrates a function that satisfies each possible set of two.
Table 2.1: Characterizing approval voting with two alternatives.
Neutrality Consistency Discerning Non-Deviating Cancellation
Neutrality FX FX g FX FX
Consistency FX g g FX FX
Discerning g g g g Theorem 2.31
Non-Deviating FX FX g FX FX
Cancellation FX FX Theorem 2.31 FX FX
2.5 ALLOWING THE EMPTY SET AS A SOCIAL OUTCOME
By Theorem 2.15, we know that under the conditions of neutrality, consis-
tency, cancellation, and discerning that if f(pi) 6= ∅ for all profiles pi then f is the
approval voting rule. Consider the following rule g : N0P(X) → P(X) defined by:
g(pi) =

FA(pi) if |FA(pi)| ∈ {1, |X|}
∅ otherwise.
Lemma 2.32. The rule g satisfies consistency.
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Proof. Suppose pi and pi′ are profiles such that g(pi)∩g(pi′) 6= ∅. If g(pi) = g(pi′) = X,
then g(pi + pi′) = X and thus g(pi) ∩ g(pi′) = g(pi + pi′).
Now suppose g(pi) ∩ g(pi′) 6= X. Then, without loss of generality, we may
assume g(pi) 6= X. Thus g(pi) = {x} where v(x, pi) > v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x} and
v(x, pi′) ≥ v(y, pi′) for all y. Hence g(pi) ∩ g(pi′) = {x}. Observe that
v(x, pi + pi′) = v(x, pi) + v(x, pi′)
> v(y, pi) + v(y, pi′) for all y ∈ X \ {x}
= v(y, pi + pi′)
Thus FA(pi + pi
′) = {x} which implies g(pi + pi′) = {x} = g(pi) ∩ g(pi′), and hence
the g rule satisfies consistency.
Lemma 2.33. The rule g satisfies cancellation.
Proof. Suppose pi is a profile such that v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) for all x, y. Then by
definition of the approval voting rule, |FA(pi)| = |X|, thus g(pi) = FA(pi) = X. And
thus the rule g satisfies cancellation.
Lemma 2.34. The rule g is discerning.
Proof. Let pi ∈ N0P(X) be a profile. Suppose v(x, pi) > v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
Then, by definition of the approval voting rule, |FA(pi)| = |{x}| = 1. Thus g(pi) =
{x} and so x ∈ g(pi).
Now suppose that v(x, pi) < v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X \{x}. Then by definition of
the approval voting rule, x /∈ FA(pi) it follows that x /∈ g(pi). Hence g is discerning.
Lemma 2.35. The g rule satisfies neutrality.
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X).
Then by Lemma 2.5 it follows that v(x, pi) = v(σ[x], pi′) for all x ∈ X. Also note
that g(pi) ⊆ FA(pi) for all pi.
29
Using the definition of g and Lemma 2.5, we get the following:
x ∈ g(pi) ⇐⇒ v(x, pi) ≥ v(y, pi)
⇐⇒ v(σ[x], pi′) ≥ v(σ[y], pi′)
⇐⇒ σ(x) ∈ g(pi′)
Thus g satisfies neutrality.
Observe we have found a rule satisfying each of our 4 axioms, and thus we
cannot characterize Approval Voting with these four axioms in this model. However
we suspect the following characterization holds in this model.
Conjecture 2.1. The aggregation function f : N0P(X) → P(X) satisfies cancella-




Under the framework of collective approval rules in Chapter 2, our rules
aggregated every voter’s approval set of alternatives into a nonempty subset of X.
In this chapter we will study social choice functions where voters may not be able
to choose the set of alternatives they approve of as a ballot. Instead they must
approve of a ballot among a set of admissible ballots.
In some cases a voter may be either more or less sincere about the alternatives
they are approving of. The ballot space consisting of each alternative as a single
ballot is one example, in this scenario voters are forced to pick a more sincere
preference from their approval set of alternatives. Another scenario we can consider
is where each voter must select a ballot of at least three alternatives. In this case
some voters must choose the ballot with the largest amount of candidates they
approve of along with some candidates they may not approve of.
As in Chapter 2, the finite set of alternatives is X = {x1, . . . , xm} with
m ≥ 2. Let
B ⊆ P(X),
we define B as a ballot space and B ∈ B as an Admissible Ballot. In this
model our ballot response profiles are functions
pi : B→ N0
with the interpretation that pi(B) represents the number of voters that chose the
ballot B ∈ B. The set of all profiles on the ballot space B is denoted by N0B. The
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type of functions we are considering will be of the form
f : N0B → Pne(X).
We will refer to this class of functions as ballot aggregation rules.
3.1 NON-PREFERENTIAL BALLOTS
In the model of collective approval rules, we allow any voter to choose the set
of alternatives they approve of as their vote; even if that happens to be the empty
set or the entire set of alternatives. Although allowing the empty set of alternatives
or the entire set of alternatives as admissible ballots shows no preference among the
alternatives, they are needed to satisfy the inherent purpose of collective approval
rules, which is to allow a voter to cast their sincere vote. If one voter approves
of the entire set of alternatives, but can not cast that as a ballot, then we can no
longer consider it collective approval voting since the function isn’t aggregating that
voter’s true approval set.
In this section we will be discussing ballot spaces B such that
{B ∈ P(X) : B 6= ∅, B 6= X} ⊆ B.
The results of Fishburn [9], Alo´s-Ferrer [2], Duddy and Piggins [6], and
Ninjbat [14] vary slightly from each other depending on whether the empty set
and/or the entire set of alternatives belong to the ballot space B.
We now will study other known characterizations of Approval Voting and
whether the results still hold if you remove or add either of these sets as admissible
ballots.
“The Characterization remains unchanged if the full ballot is allowed
for. Allowing for the empty ballot requires to specify that aggregation
of a single, empty ballot results in the full set of candidates.”
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Alo´s-Ferrer [2]
Alo´s-Ferrer is correct when he states that the characterization remains un-
changed if the full ballot is allowed for. However, by Lemma 2.9, we have shown that
we do not need to modify the definition of approval voting to require the aggregation
of a single empty ballot to result in the full set of candidates if our rule satisfies non-
deviating, faithfulness, and consistency. In the characterizations of Theorems 2.12
and 2.15 we do not explicitly assume the conditions of non-deviating, faithfulness,
and consistency. However, by Lemmas 2.13 and 2.14 we have that the function
still satisfies those three conditions, and thus we still do not need to modify the
definition of approval voting to require the aggregation of a single empty ballot to
result in the full set of candidates.
We now consider the role of neutrality and consistency in the matter of
allowing the empty set of alternatives or the entire set of alternatives as admissible
ballots. Suppose f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies neutrality and consistency. Now
suppose pi is a profile such that pi(B) = 0 for all B ∈ P(X) \ {∅, X}. If σ is an
arbitrary permutation of X and pi′ is the profile such that,
pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ P(X).
Then pi = pi′, thus by neutrality f(pi) = σ[f(pi)]. Since f(pi) 6= ∅ and σ was arbitrary,
it follows that f(pi) = X.
For any profile ρ ∈ N0P(X), define profiles ρˆ and ρ˜ By
ρˆ(B) =






ρ(B) if B ∈ {∅, X}
0 otherwise.
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Notice that ρ = ρˆ + ρ˜. From above, f(ρ˜) = X; by consistency we have
f(ρ) = f(ρˆ). Therefore given neutrality and consistency it does not matter if the
empty set of alternatives or the entire set of alternatives are allowed as admissible
ballots or not.
3.2 LEXICOGRAPHICAL SCORING RULES
In this section we will be studying a generalization of rules introduced by
Fishburn [9]. The ballot aggregation rules we will be considering are threshold rules
that use score functions as a threshold. Let A be the set containing all possible
ballot spaces,
C : A→ P({1, 2, . . . , |X|})
is a function with the interpretation that for a ballot space B, C(B) is the set
containing the natural numbers corresponding to the size of the ballots in B. That
is to say that
B ∈ B⇒ |B| ∈ C(B).
For a ballot space B, a score function on B is a function
s : C(B)→ R,
which assigns a real number to each ballot based on its cardinality. Next, for each
alternative x ∈ X and profile pi, let




Using this notation, a social choice function f on B is said to be a simple
scoring function on B if there is a score function s such that
f(pi) = {x ∈ X : p(x, pi, s) ≥ p(y, pi, s) ∀ y ∈ X} for all pi ∈ N0B.
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We will denote a simple scoring function on B with score function s by fs. When
s(|B|) = 1 for all B ∈ B, we will say f is the majority rule and denote it FM .
In the case where f is a simple scoring function with score function s such that
s(|B|) = −1 for all B ∈ B, f is said to be the inverse majority rule and we
will denote it FM−1 . Last, when f is a simple scoring function with score function
s such that s(|B|) = 0 for all B ∈ B, f is said to be the trivial rule which always
selects the whole set of alternatives, and we will denote it fX . So f(pi) = X for all
profiles pi ∈ N0B.
Now we will characterize the set of all simple scoring functions based on
constant score functions.
Proposition 3.1. If f : N0B → Pne(X) is a simple scoring function determined by
score function s : C(B) → R such that for all B ∈ B, s(|B|) = a for some a ∈ R.
Then p(x, pi, s) = a · v(x, pi). Furthermore,
1. If a > 0, then f = FM .
2. If a < 0, then f = FM−1.
3. If a = 0, then f = fX .
Proof. Let f be a simple scoring function determined by the score function such
that for all B ∈ B, s(|B|) = a for some a ∈ R. Observe that;












= a · v(x, pi).
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First suppose that a 6= 0. Since v(xi, pi) ≥ 0 for all xi ∈ X, then for a ≥ 0,
a · v(x, pi) ≥ a · v(y, pi) if and only if v(x, pi) ≥ v(y, pi). By the definition of simple
scoring function,
f(pi) = {x ∈ X : p(x, pi, s) ≥ p(y, pi, s) ∀ y ∈ X}
= {x ∈ X : a · v(x, pi) ≥ a · v(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ X}
= {x ∈ X : 1 · v(x, pi) ≥ 1 · v(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ X}
= FM(pi).
Now suppose a < 0. Then it follows that (−a) > 0 and hence,
f(pi) = {x ∈ X : p(x, pi, s) ≥ p(y, pi, s) ∀ y ∈ X}
= {x ∈ X : a · v(x, pi) ≥ a · v(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ X}
= {x ∈ X : (−a) · (−1) · v(x, pi) ≥ (−a) · (−1) · v(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ X}
= {x ∈ X : (−1) · v(x, pi) ≥ (−1) · v(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ X}
= FM−1(pi).
And finally if a = 0, then by f = fX by definition.
From now on we will use the fact that FM(pi) = fs(pi) where s is the score
function s(B) = 1 for all B ∈ B. Also notice in the proof above we have that
FM(pi) = {x ∈ X : 1 · v(x, pi) ≥ 1 · v(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ X}
= {x ∈ X : v(x, pi) ≥ v(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ X}
= {x ∈ X : v(x, pi) = max v(pi)}
which aligns with the idea of Approval Voting, but since voters may not choose any
set of alternatives they approve of as a ballot, we will only refer to it as Approval
Voting in the case that B = P(X).
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We will now consider a larger class of scoring rules introduced by Fishburn
(1979). For score functions
s1, . . . , sT : C(B)→ R,
an alternative x ∈ X is said to lexicographically dominate the alternative
y ∈ X\{x} for a profile pi if either p(x, pi, s1) > p(y, pi, s1) or there is a j ∈ {2, . . . , T}
such that p(x, pi, si) ≥ p(y, pi, si) for all si ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} and p(x, pi, sj) >
p(y, pi, sj). We will denote “x lexicographically dominates y” by xLDy.
A social choice function f is said to be a Lexicographical Scoring Rule
if there exists score functions s1, . . . , sT such that
f(pi) = {x ∈ X : @ y ∈ X s.t. yLDx}.
We let fs1,...,sT denote a Lexicographical Scoring Rule determined by score functions
s1, . . . , sT .
Lemma 3.2. The relation LD on the set X is irreflexive and transitive.
Proof. We will first show that (X,LD) is irreflexive. Consider that for any profile pi
and x ∈ X, p(x, pi, si) 6< p(x, pi, si) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , T} and hence x LDx. Therefore
(X,LD) is irreflexive.
We now show that (X,LD) is transitive. Let pi ∈ N0B and x, y, z ∈ X such
that xLDy and yLDz. Since xLDy we have that p(x, pi, s1) > p(y, pi, s1) or there
exists j ∈ {2, . . . , T} such that p(x, pi, si) ≥ p(y, pi, si) for all si ∈ {1, . . . , j− 1} and
p(x, pi, sj) > p(y, pi, sj). Similarly for yLDz.
We first consider that p(x, pi, s1) > p(y, pi, s1), hence
p(x, pi, s1) > p(y, pi, s1) ≥ p(z, pi, s1).
Thus, p(x, pi, s1) > p(z, pi, s1) and we have that xLDz. Similarly if p(y, pi, s1) >
p(z, pi, s1) we have
p(x, pi, s1) ≥ p(y, pi, s1) > p(z, pi, s1)
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with p(x, pi, s1) > p(z, pi, s1) and again we have that xLDz.
Now consider that p(x, pi, s1) 6> p(y, pi, s1) and p(y, pi, s1) 6> p(z, pi, s1). Thus
we have that there exists j1, j2 ∈ {2, . . . , T} such that
p(x, pi, si) ≥ p(y, pi, si) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , j1 − 1} & p(x, pi, sj1) > p(y, pi, sj1)
and p(y, pi, si′) ≥ p(z, pi, si′) for all i′ ∈ {2, . . . , j2 − 1} & p(y, pi, sj2) > p(z, pi, sj2).
We first consider that j1 ≤ j2. Thus we have
p(x, pi, sj1) > p(y, pi, sj1) ≥ p(z, pi, sj1),
and for i ∈ {2, . . . , j1 − 1} we have
p(x, pi, si) ≥ p(y, pi, si) ≥ p(z, pi, si).
Therefore it follows that xLDz. Similarly if j1 > j2 we have
p(x, pi, sj2) ≥ p(y, pi, sj2) > p(z, pi, sj2),
and for i ∈ {2, . . . , j2 − 1} we have
p(x, pi, si) ≥ p(y, pi, si) ≥ p(z, pi, si).
Therefore it follows that xLDz and thus (X,LD) is transitive. We have shown that
(X,LD) is a irreflexive transitive relation.
To give an example of a lexicographical scoring rule that is not a simple scor-
ing rule, consider the collective approval rule defined in Section 2.3 fw : N0P(X) →
Pne(X) defined by







To phrase this function in terms of lexicographical scoring rules consider the
functions
s1, s2 : C(B)→ R
defined by for all ballots B ∈ B, s1(|B|) = 1 and s2(|B|) = −|B|. Observe that
any alternative not in the Majority output gets lexicographically dominated in the
score function s1. In Chapter 2 we defined this as a refinement of Approval Voting.
Alternatives that are lexicographically dominated in the score function s2 are still
in the Majority Outcome, but with less decisive voters who approve of them.
Lemma 3.3. For all profiles pi ∈ N0B, fw(pi) = fs1,s2(pi).
Proof. We first consider that for x ∈ X we have that









Similarly for x ∈ X we have that,













Let pi ∈ N0B be an arbitrary profile and let x ∈ fw(pi). By way of contra-
diction suppose that x /∈ fs1,s2(pi), hence we have that there exists z ∈ X such
that zLDx. Since zLDx we have either p(z, pi, s1) > p(x, pi, s1) or we have that
p(z, pi, s1) ≥ p(x, pi, s1) and p(z, pi, s2) > p(x, pi, s2). Since x ∈ fw(pi) we have that
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v(x, pi) ≥ v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X; this fact along with the fact that p(x, pi, s1) = v(x, pi)
gives us that p(x, pi, s1) ≥ p(y, pi, s1) for all y ∈ X and hence p(x, pi, s1) ≥ p(z, pi, s1).
It follows we are in the second case with p(x, pi, s1) = p(z, pi, s1) and p(z, pi, s2) >
p(x, pi, s2). Since p(x, pi, s1) = p(z, pi, s1) we have that x, z ∈ FM(pi). Observe
that p(x, pi, s2) = −w(x, pi) for all x ∈ X and p(z, pi, s2) > p(x, pi, s2) implies that
w(x, pi) > w(z, pi), contrary to x ∈ {x ∈ FM(pi) : w(x, pi) ≤ w(y, pi) ∀ y ∈ FA(pi)}.
Thus we have that x ∈ fs1,s2(pi) and thus fw(pi) ⊆ fs1,s2(pi).
Now let x ∈ fs1,s2(pi) and by way of contradiction suppose that x /∈ fw(pi).
It follows that either x /∈ FM(pi) or x ∈ FM(pi) with w(x, pi) > w(z, pi) for some
z ∈ FM(pi). First lets consider that since x ∈ fs1,s2(pi) along with the fact that
v(y, pi) = p(y, pi, s1) for all y ∈ X, gives us that v(x, pi) ≥ v(y, pi) for all y ∈ X. But
since x /∈ fw(pi) it follows that there exists a z ∈ FM(pi) such that v(x, pi) = v(z, pi)
and w(x, pi) > w(z, pi). By the fact p(y, pi, s2) = −w(y, pi) for all y ∈ X we have
that p(z, pi, s2) > p(x, pi, s2) with p(z, pi, s1) ≥ p(x, pi, s1) and thus zLDx, contrary
to x ∈ fs1,s2(pi). It follows that x ∈ fw(pi) and thus fs1,s2(pi) ⊆ fw(pi).
Since pi was chosen arbitrarily with fw(pi) ⊆ fs1,s2(pi) and fs1,s2(pi) ⊆ fw(pi),
it follows that for all profiles pi ∈ N0B we have fw(pi) = fs1,s2(pi).
We now give some defining characteristics of ballot aggregation functions.
We will say that a ballot space B is permutation closed if, for any permutation
σ on X and for any B ∈ B, σ(B) ∈ B. A social choice function f on a permutation
closed ballot space B satisfies neutrality if, for any profiles pi and pi′ and for any
permutation σ of X,
pi′(σ(B)) = pi(B) for all B ∈ B ⇒ σ (f(pi)) = f(pi′).
Lemma 3.4. If B is a permutation closed ballot space, s : C(B) → R is a score
function and pi, pi′ are two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ B then
p(x, pi, s) = p(σ[x], pi′, s) for all x ∈ X.
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Proof. Let pi and pi′ be two profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) = pi(B) for all B ∈ B. For
any x ∈ X notice that












= p(σ[x], pi′, s).
Hence p(x, pi, s) = p(σ[x], pi′, s) for all x ∈ X.
Proposition 3.5. If B is a permutation closed ballot space, then majority rule,
inverse majority rule, and the trivial rule satisfy neutrality.
Proof. For each of these functions we will consider pi, pi′ as profiles such that pi′(σ[B]) =
pi(B) for all B ∈ B. By proposition 3.1, FM is determined by a positive constant
score function s. Therefore for any x ∈ X and pi ∈ N0B,
x ∈ FM(pi) ⇐⇒ p(x, pi, s) ≥ p(x, pi, s) ∀ y ∈ X
⇐⇒ p(σ[x], pi′, s) ≥ p(σ[y], pi′, s) by Lemma 3.4
⇐⇒ σ(x) ∈ FM(pi′).
Hence FM(pi
′) = σ(FM(pi)) and so FM satisfies neutrality.
To show Inverse Majority is neutral, consider that by proposition 3.1, FM−1
is determined by a negative constant score function s. Therefore for any x ∈ X and
pi ∈ N0B,
x ∈ FM−1(pi) ⇐⇒ p(x, pi, s) ≤ p(y, pi, s) ∀ y ∈ X
⇐⇒ p(σ[x], pi′, s) ≤ p(σ[y], pi′, s) by Lemma 3.4
⇐⇒ σ(x) ∈ FM−1(pi′)
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Hence FM−1(pi
′) = σ(FM−1(pi)) and so FM−1 satisfies neutrality. To show fX is
neutral, consider that for every x ∈ X, x ∈ fX(pi), hence every σ(x) ∈ fX(pi′). Hence
the rules Majority, Inverse Majority, and fX satisfies neutrality as was desired.
We define the remaining axioms of non-deviating, consistency, faithfulness,
and cancellation the same way as is in Chapter 2 without modification.
Proposition 3.6. Majority rule, inverse majority rule, and the trivial rule satisfy
consistency.
Proof. Let pi and ρ be profiles and assume that FM(pi) ∩ FM(ρ) 6= ∅. To show
FM(pi)∩FM(ρ) ⊆ FM(pi+ρ), let x ∈ FM(pi)∩FM(ρ) and recall that FM is determined
by a positive constant score function s. Thus p(x, pi, s) ≥ p(y, pi, s) and p(x, ρ, s) ≥
p(y, ρ, s) for all y ∈ X. Observe that:
p(x, pi + ρ, s) = p(x, pi, s) + p(x, ρ, s)
≥ p(y, pi, s) + p(y, ρ, s) ∀ y ∈ X
= p(y, pi + ρ, s)
Thus x ∈ FM(pi + ρ)
Now to show FM(pi) ∩ FM(ρ) ⊇ FM(pi + ρ), let z ∈ FM(pi + ρ). Thus
p(z, pi+ρ, s) = p(z, pi, s)+p(z, ρ, s). If z ∈ FM(pi)∩FM(ρ) we are done. Then we may
assume that z /∈ FM(pi). Choose y ∈ FM(pi)∩FM(ρ) such that p(z, pi, s) < p(y, pi, s)
and so, p(y, pi, s)− p(z, pi, s) > 0. Given p(z, pi + ρ, s) ≥ p(y, pi + ρ, s) for all y ∈ X
it follows that:
p(z, pi, s) + p(z, ρ, s) ≥ p(y, pi, s) + p(y, ρ, s)
p(z, ρ, s) ≥ (p(y, pi, s)− p(z, pi, s)) + p(y, ρ, s)
p(z, ρ, s) > p(y, ρ, s) since p(y, pi, s)− p(z, pi, s) > 0
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contrary to y ∈ FM(ρ). Hence it follows that FM(pi) ∩ FM(ρ) ⊇ FM(pi + ρ). Thus
FM(pi) ∩ FM(ρ) = FM(pi + ρ) and hence the FM satisfies consistency.
A similar argument works to show that Inverse Majority is consistent. It is
trivial to show that fX is consistent. Hence the rules Majority, Inverse Majority,
and fX satisfy consistency.
Proposition 3.7. Majority rule, inverse majority rule, and the trivial rule satisfy
cancellation.
Proof. For each of these functions we will consider a profile pi such that v(x, pi) =
v(y, pi) for all x, y ∈ X. Observe that since each of these three functions are simple
scoring functions, f(pi) = {x ∈ X : p(x, pi, s) ≥ p(y, pi, s)} = X since for each of
the three scoring functions p(x, pi, s) = p(y, pi, s) for all x, y ∈ X. Hence the rules
Majority, Inverse Majority, and fX satisfies cancellation as was desired.
We now discuss a class of ballot spaces introduced by Fishburn (1979). Sup-
pose a ballot space B ⊆ P(X) satisfies
1. For all B ∈ B, λ(B) ∈ B for all permutations λ : X → X.
2. For all x, y ∈ X, there is a B ∈ B such that x ∈ B and y /∈ B.
Then we will say B satisfies basic richness, or B is a rich ballot space. We can
describe such spaces as permutation closed ballot where B /∈ {{∅}, {X}, {∅, X}}.
Furthermore, if P(X)\{∅, X} ⊆ B, we will sayB is an unrestricted ballot space.
We now state a result by Fishburn [8], about ballot spaces satisfying basic
richness:
Theorem 3.8. (Fishburn 1979) For any ballot space satisfying basic richness: a
social choice function f : N0B → Pne(X) satisfies Neutrality and Consistency if
and only if it is a Lexicographical Scoring Rule. Moreover, f is determined by score
functions s1, . . . , sT such that 0 < T ≤ |X|.
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We have shown that Majority, Inverse Majority, and fX are three such func-
tions. In addition these three functions also satisfy cancellation. This raises the
question: what is the class of lexicographical scoring rules satisfying cancellation?
For the unrestricted ballot spaces Ninjbat [14] provides an answer to this question.
Theorem 3.9. (Ninjbat 2013) For B = Pne(X), a social choice function f :
N0Pne(X) → Pne(X) satisfies neutrality, consistency, and cancellation if and only
if f = FM , f = FM−1, or f = fX .
The question now is: Does this result extend to any larger class of bal-
lot spaces? To answer this question we will return to the axiom we introduced
in Chapter 2 of non-deviating. Our goal is to show that if f is cancellative and
consistent, then f is non-deviating. We first state and prove two lemmas and a
corollary.
Lemma 3.10. For every B ∈ B, there exists ρ ∈ N0B such that for all x ∈ X,
v(x, piB + ρ) = k for some k ∈ N0.








Bc = {C ⊆ X : |C| = c}.







if xi /∈ B.(
m−1
c−1
)− 1 if xi ∈ B
Consider the profile piB + ρ, and observe that
v(x, piB + ρ) = v(x, piB) + v(x, ρ) for each x ∈ X.
Since v(x, piB) = 1 if x ∈ B and v(x, piB) = 0 if x /∈ B it follows that,
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• If x ∈ B,












• If x /∈ B,















) ∈ N0 for every x ∈ X.
Lemma 3.11. For every profile pi ∈ N0B, there exists a profile ρ ∈ N0B such that
for all x ∈ X, v(x, pi + ρ) = k for some k ∈ N0.




pi(Bi) · piBi .









pi(Bi) · piρi .
Thus
pi + ρ =
∑
Bi∈B















It follows that for each x ∈ X,
v(x, pi + ρ) = v(x, piB1 + piρ1) + · · ·+ v(x, piBn + piρn)
= k1 + · · ·+ kn
Hence for all x ∈ X, v(x, pi + ρ) = k for k = k1 + · · · kn ∈ N0.
Corollary 3.12. If B is a permutation closed ballot space and f : N0B → Pne(X)
satisfies cancellation, then for every profile pi ∈ N0B, there exists a profile ρ ∈ N0B
such that
f(pi + ρ) = X.
Proof. By Lemma 3.11, there exists a profile ρ ∈ N0B such that for all x ∈ X,
v(x, pi + ρ) = k for some k ∈ N0. It follows by cancellation that f(pi + ρ) = X as
was desired.
Proposition 3.13. If f : N0B → Pne(X) satisfies cancellation and consistency then
f is non-deviating.
Proof. Let pi and pi′ be profiles such that v(x, pi) = v(x, pi′) for every alternative
x ∈ X. By Lemma 3.11, let ρ be a profile such that for every x ∈ X, v(x, pi+ρ) = k
for some k ∈ N0. By Corollary 3.12, we have that f(pi + ρ) = X.
Observe that since for each x ∈ X v(x, pi + ρ) = k, we have v(x, pi + ρ) =
v(x, pi) + v(x, ρ) = k. Thus,
v(x, ρ) = k − v(x, pi). (3.1)
Using Equation 3.1 and the hypothesis, for any x ∈ X,
v(x, pi′ + ρ) = v(x, pi′) + v(x, ρ) for x ∈ X
= v(x, pi′) + k − v(x, pi)
= v(x, pi′) + k − v(x, pi′)
= k.
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Thus, by cancellation, f(pi′ + ρ) = X. Notice that by consistency we have that
f(pi + pi′ + ρ) = f(pi) ∩X = f(pi)
since f(pi′ + ρ) = X. Similarly since f(pi + ρ) = X we have
f(pi′ + pi + ρ) = f(pi′) ∩X = f(pi′).
We have f(pi) = f(pi + pi′ + ρ) = f(pi′) and thus f is non-deviating.
We now will use the axiom of non-deviating to show that every score function
constituting a cancellative lexicographical scoring rule must be a constant function.
Lemma 3.14. If s1, . . . , sT : C(B) → R are score functions determining a lexico-
graphical scoring rule f satisfying cancellation, then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , T}, si is a
constant function. That is for all ballots B ∈ B, si(|B|) = ki for some ki ∈ R.
Proof. Let st be a score function determining the lexicographical scoring rule f
satisfying cancellation. First consider the case that C(B) = {c}. For B,B′ ∈ B it
follows that
st(|B|) = st(c) = st(|B′|).
We will now assume that |C(B)| ≥ 2 and st(cj) = kt ∈ R where cj =
min C(B). We will show that st(ck) = st(cj) = kt for any ck ∈ C(B). Let ck ∈ C(B),
if ck = cj we are done, so by minimality of cj we may assume cj < ck. Choose B ∈ B













































 by Proposition 3.13
= f(ρ).
By construction v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) for all x, y ∈ X and thus by cancellation it follows
that f(pi) = f(ρ) = X. Since f is a lexicographical scoring rule with f(ρ) = X it
follows that p(x, ρ, st) = p(y, ρ, st) for all x, y ∈ X. Choose x′ ∈ B and y′ /∈ B. We
have that





















































we get that st(ck) = st(cj). It follows for each
ck ∈ C(B) that st(ck) = st(cj) = kt. Hence each score function st must be a constant
function.
Theorem 3.15. If B is a rich ballot space, then a lexicographical scoring function
f : N0B → Pne(X) satisfies cancellation if and only if f is majority rule, inverse
majority rule, or the trivial rule.
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Proof. We have shown that the rules FM , FM−1 , and fX each satisfy cancellation.
Let f : N0B → Pne(X) be a fixed social choice function which satisfies cancellation.
So let s1, ..., sT be the score functions determining f . By Lemma 3.14, we know
that each si is a constant function, so let si(|B|) = ki for all B ∈ B.
Choose a ballot B ∈ B and consider f (piB). Since f(piB) 6= ∅, there exists
an x ∈ X such that x ∈ f(piB). There are two possibilities, either x ∈ B or
x /∈ B. First consider that x ∈ B. Consider x′ ∈ X such that x′ ∈ B, then for the
permutation σ = (x x′), consider the profile pi′ defined by pi′(σ[C]) = piB(C) for all
C ∈ B. Observe that piB = pi′ and thus f (piB) = f(pi′). By neutrality we have that;
σ[f (piB)] = f(pi
′) = f (piB) .
Thus it follows that x′ = σ(x) ∈ f (piB). Since x′ was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that B ⊆ f (piB). Conversely if x /∈ f (piB) then B 6⊆ f (piB).
Now we will consider another element y /∈ B. If y ∈ f (piB) then a similar
argument shows that Bc ⊆ f (piB); and conversely if y /∈ f (piB) then Bc 6⊆ f (piB).
Hence it follows that we either have f(piB) = B, or f(piB) = X \ B, or f(piB) = X.
We will consider each of these three cases separately.
Case 1: Lets consider that f(piB) = B. Observe that by definition of a
lexicographical score that there is a score function si such that for x ∈ B and
y ∈ Bc such that xLDy. Hence p(x, piB, si) > p(y, piB, si). Since si(B) = ki, and
p(y, piB, si) = 0 it follows that ki > 0.
If f is a simple scoring rule, then f = FM by Lemma 3.10 and we are done.
Otherwise, suppose that f is not a simple scoring rule, thus there is a j > i such that
xLDy for sj but x LD y for si. Since x LD y for si, it follows that p(x, pi, st) = p(y, pi, st)
for t ∈ {1, .., i}. Thus k1 · v(x, pi) = k1 · v(y, pi), and since k1 > 0 it follows that
v(x, pi) = v(y, pi). By hypothesis p(x, pi, sj) > p(y, pi, sj), since sj(|B|) = kj it follows
that kj ·v(x, pi) > kj ·v(y, pi), but v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) implies that kj ·v(x, pi) = kj ·v(y, pi)
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a contradiction. Thus f is a simple scoring rule and thus f = FM .
Case 2: Consider that f(piB) = X \ B. Observe that by definition of a
lexicographical score that there is a score function si such that for x ∈ B and
y ∈ Bc such that yLDx. Hence p(y, piB, si) > p(x, piB, si). Since si(B) = ki, and
p(y, piB, si) = 0 it follows that ki < 0.
If f is a simple scoring rule, then f = FM−1 by lemma [3.10] and we are done.
Now suppose that f is not a simple scoring rule, thus there is a j > i such that xLDy
for sj but x LD y for si. Since x LD y for si, it follows that p(x, pi, st) = p(y, pi, st)
for t ∈ {1, . . . , i}. Thus k1 · v(x, pi) = k1 · v(y, pi), and since k1 > 0 it follows that
v(x, pi) = v(y, pi). By hypothesis p(x, pi, sj) > p(y, pi, sj), since sj(|B|) = kj it follows
that kj ·v(x, pi) > kj ·v(y, pi), but v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) implies that kj ·v(x, pi) = kj ·v(y, pi)
a contradiction. Thus f is a simple scoring rule and thus f = FM−1 .
Case 3: The last case to consider is that f(piB) = X. Since we chose B
arbitrarily in the first step, we may assume that |B| is minimal in C(B), we will
first show that f(piB′) = X for all B
′ ∈ B.












By consistency the left hand side of equation (3.2) is X. Observe that by consistency
that f(k · piD) = f(piD) for all k ∈ N. Hence by transitivity f(piB) = X.





Hence pi = piB1 + · · · + piBn . But since f(piBi) = X for each Bi. It follows by
consistency that
f(pi) = f(piB1 + · · ·+ piBn) = f(piB1) ∩ · · · ∩ f(Bn) = X ∩ · · · ∩X = X
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Hence it follows that f = fX . f : N0B → Pne(X) is a lexicographical scoring
function with B a rich ballot space satisfies cancellation if and only if f = FM ,
f = FM−1 , or f = fX as was desired.
Using the fact that lexicographical scoring function are implicitly neutral and
consistent, we get a nice extension of Theorem 3.9 to include all rich ballot spaces.
Theorem 3.16. A rule f : N0B → Pne(X) defined on any rich ballot space satisfying
neutrality, consistency, and cancellation if and only if f = FM , f = FM−1 or
f = fX .
Another natural extension we can discuss is the extension of Theorem 2.15
in Chapter 2 to include rich ballot spaces.
Lemma 3.17. The social choice rules inverse approval voting and the trivial rule
violate the axiom of discerning.
Proof. Choose B ∈ B, and let x /∈ B. Consider the profile ρ generated by all ballots






Observe that it follows that v(x, ρ) = 0 whereas v(y, ρ) > 0 for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
By definition of Inverse Majority, FM−1(ρ) = {x}. By definition of fX , fX(ρ) = X.
Hence both functions violate the axiom of discerning.
We now can extend Theorem 2.15 to include all rich ballot spaces as a result
of Theorem 3.15 and the previous Lemma.
Theorem 3.18. For B satisfying basic richness, a social choice function f : N0B →
Pne(X) satisfies neutrality, discerning, consistency, and cancellation if and only if
f is majority rule.
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3.3 CHARACTERIZING MAJORITY ON j-RICH BALLOT SPACES
In this section we will assume m ≥ 4 and so X = {x1, . . . , xm}. For any
integer k belonging to the interval [1,m], the set
Bk = {B ⊆ X : |B| = k}
is the ballot space consisting of all ballots of size k. For example, B1 is the ballot
space consisting of each alternative on an individual ballot. That is,
B1 = {{x} : x ∈ X}.






for some nonempty subset I of {0, . . . ,m} where B0 = {∅} .
For some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, we will say that a ballot space B is j-rich if
Bj ⊆ B. It should be noted that although ballot spaces satisfying basic richness
are j-rich, a j-rich ballot space need not satisfy basic richness. For example B1 ∪
{{x1, x2}} is a j rich ballot space, but does not satisfy basic richness since it is
not permutation closed. Hence j-richness is more general than the basic richness
conditions. However, both types of richness incorporate some interesting classes of
ballot spaces.
We now give two simple characterizations on (m− 1)-rich ballot spaces and
3-rich ballot spaces.
Theorem 3.19. The function f : N0Bm−1 → Pne(X) satisfies faithfulness, consis-
tency, and cancellation if and only if f = FM .
Proof. We have shown that FM satisfies consistency, faithfulness, and cancellation
for all ballot spaces. It is left to show that if f : N0Bm−1 → Pne(X) satisfies
consistency, faithfulness, and cancellation, then f = FM .
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Let f : N0Bm−1 → Pne(X) be an aggregation function that is faithful, consis-






= X \ {xi}









Let pi be an arbitrary profile, and let
j = min{pi(B) : B ∈ B}.
If j = 0, then there exists a ballot X \ {x′} ∈ B that gets no votes. Notice that
x′ ∈ B for all B ∈ B such that pi(B) > 0. Now by faithfulness x′ ∈ f(piB) for each
B such that pi(B) > 0. Observe that
⋂
pi(B)>0









X \ {xi} where I = {i : pi(X \ {xi}) > 0}
= FM(pi)
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(pi(B)− j) · piB
)
by consistency.
Observe that there exists a B ∈ B such that pi(B) − j = 0, hence by the previous








Theorem 3.20. Let B be a ballot space such that B1,B2,B3 ⊆ B. The aggregation
function f : N0B → Pne(X) satisfies faithfulness, consistency, and cancellation if
and only if f = FM .
Proof. Let B be a ballot space such that B1,B2,B3 ⊆ B. We have shown that FM
satisfies consistency, faithfulness, and cancellation for all ballot spaces. It is left to
show that if f : N0B → Pne(X) satisfies consistency, faithfulness, and cancellation,
then f = FM .
Let pi ∈ N0B, if FM(pi) = X then we have that v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) for all
alternatives x, y ∈ X. Hence by cancellation we have that f(pi) = X which coincides
with Majority Rule.
Now we will suppose that |FM(pi)| = m − 1. Without loss of generality we
may assume that FM(pi) = {x1, . . . , xm−1}. By way of contradiction we will assume
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that xm ∈ f(pi) and let l = v(x1, pi) − v(xm, pi) > 0. Observe that by faithfulness
and consistency we have that
f
(
pi + l · pixm
)
= f(pi) ∩ f (pixm)
= {xm}
By cancellation, f(pi + l · pixm) = X. Hence xm /∈ f(pi), that is f(pi) ⊆ FM(pi). Now
we will suppose that f(pi) 6= FM(pi), hence that there exists an xj ∈ FM(pi) \ f(pi),
and we will let xi ∈ f(pi). Since f satisfies consistency and cancellation, we have
that f satisfies non-deviating by Proposition 3.13. Thus,
f
(






v(xi, pi) · pi{xi} + l · pi{xi,xj}
)
= X ∩ {xi, xj}
= {xi, xj}.
But,
xi ∈ f(pi) ∩ f
(
l · pi{xi,xj ,xm}
)
and
xj /∈ f(pi) ∩ f
(
l · pi{xi,xj ,xm}
)
⇒ xj /∈ f
(
pi + l · pi{xi,xj ,xm}
)
which is a contradiction. Hence we know that if |FM(pi)| = m − 1, then we have
that f(pi) = FM(pi).
Now we will let let pi ∈ N0B be a profile such that |FM(pi)| = n, for some
n ∈ {1, ...,m − 2}. Without loss of generality, we will let x ∈ FM(pi) and hence
v(x, pi) = max v(pi). By way of induction we will suppose that if |FM(pi)| = n + 1
then f(pi) = FM(pi).
We will first show that, f(pi) ⊆ FM(pi). Consider z /∈ FM(pi) and let l =
max v(pi)−v(z, pi) > 0. By consistency, observe that if z ∈ f(pi) then we have that,
f
(




But observe that FM(pi) = FM(pi)∪{z} and thus
∣∣∣FM (pi + l · pi{z})∣∣∣ = n+1. Hence
by our induction hypothesis we have that f
(




pi + l · pi{z}
)
6= {z}
since |{z}| 6= n+ 1. Thus z /∈ f(pi) and hence f(pi) ⊆ FM(pi) as was desired.
Now we will show that FM(pi) ⊆ f(pi). By way of contradiction, we will
suppose that FM(pi) 6⊆ f(pi). Thus, there exists y ∈ FM(pi) \ f(pi). First consider
that since z /∈ FM(pi),∣∣∣∣∣∣FM
 ∑
xk∈X\{z}
v(xk, pi)pi{xk} + v(x1, pi) · pi{z}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = n+ 1




v(xk, pi)pi{xk} + v(x1, pi)pi{z}
 = FM(pi) ∪ {z}.
Now observe that by non-deviating we have that
f
(





v(xk, pi)pi{xk} + v(x1, pi)pi{z} + l · pi{x,y}

= {FM(pi) ∪ {z}} ∩ {x, y}
= {x, y}
But by consistency, we have that
f
(
pi + l · pi{x,y,z}
)





a contradiction, thus we have that f(pi) = FM(pi) when |FM(pi)| = n. Hence by
Induction we have that f(pi) = FM(pi) for all n ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 2}.
We have now shown that f(pi) = FM(pi) when |FM(pi)| = n for all n ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, and hence f(pi) = FM(pi).
Using the ideas from the previous two theorems we can characterize Majority
Rule on a much larger class of j-rich ballot spaces. First we state three lemmas.
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Lemma 3.21. Let j ∈ {3, . . . ,m−1} and let pi be any profile such that FM(pi) ∈ Bj
and v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) for all x, y ∈ X \ FM(pi). Then f(pi) = FM(pi).
Proof. Let α = max v(pi) and β = v(x, pi) for some x ∈ X \ FM(pi). Then α > β








ρ̂ = β ·
∑
B∈Bj












for all y ∈ FM(pi) and





for all z ∈ X \FM(pi). Since f satisfies consistincy and cancellation, then by Lemma
3.13 f is non-deviating and thus f(ρ) = f (ρ̂).
Let µ be the profile defined by
µ = (α− β) ·
∑















for all x ∈ X. By cancellation,
f(ρ+ µ) = f(µ+ ρ̂) = X.
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Using consistency we get
f(ρ) = f(ρ+ (µ+ ρ̂)) = f((ρ+ µ) + ρ̂) = f(ρ̂).






















 ∩ f (FM(pi)) by consistincy
= X ∩ f (FM(pi)) by cancellation
= FM(pi) by faithfulness.
Hence f(pi) = FM(pi) and we’re done.
For each alternative xi ∈ X, let the profile pixi be the profile that consists of

















for all t 6= i. It follows from consistency and faithfulness that f(pixi) = {xi}.


















for all i ∈ I and





for all t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}\ I. Since FM(ρ) = {x1 : i ∈ I} ∈ Bj, it follows from Lemma
3.21 that f(ρ) = {xi : i ∈ I}.






then f(ρ) = {xi : i ∈ I}.





= {xi : i ∈ I} ∪ {xt}.





 = {xi : i ∈ I}.
Note that ∑
t∈{1,...,m}\I
[ρ+ pixt ] =
m∑
i=1
pixi + (m− j)ρ.





pixi + (m− j)ρ
)
= f(ρ).
We now state and prove one of the main theorems of this thesis.
Theorem 3.24. If m ≥ 4 and 2 < j < m, then majority rule is the only social
choice function on a j-rich ballot space satisfying faithfulness, consistency, and
cancellation.
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Proof. Assume that the set
D = {pi ∈ N0B : f(pi) 6= FM(pi)}
is nonempty. So D is the set of profiles where the functions f and FM disagree.
Choose ρ ∈ D such that |FM(ρ)| is maximal. This means that if pi is a profile such
that |FM(pi)| > |FM(ρ)|, then f(pi) = FM(pi). Since f is cancellative and ρ ∈ D it
follows that FM(ρ) 6= X. So
|FM(ρ)| ≤ m− 1.
Assume that there exists x ∈ f(ρ) such that x 6∈ FM(ρ). We may assume that
x = x1. Let
` = max v(ρ)− v(x1, ρ)
and note that ` > 0. Next, let

























for all i 6= 1. If v(xi, ρ) = max v(ρ) = [`+ v(x1, ρ)], then













FM(ρ̂) = FM(ρ) ∪ {x1}.
By our choice of ρ and the fact that |FM(ρ̂)| > |FM(ρ)| it follows that
f(ρ̂) = FM(ρ̂) = FM(ρ) ∪ {x1}.
On the other hand, by consistency,
f(ρ̂) = f(ρ) ∩ f(pix1) = {x1}.
Since FM(ρ) ∪ {x1} 6= {x1} we get a contradiction. It now follows that f(ρ) ⊂
FM(ρ).
Since f(ρ) ⊂ FM(ρ) and f(ρ) 6= FM(ρ), there exists y ∈ FM(ρ) \ f(ρ). Let
x ∈ X \ FM(ρ) and z ∈ f(ρ). We may assume that x = x1, y = x2, and z = x3. As
above, let
` = max v(ρ)− v(x1, ρ)
and note that ` > 0. We now introduce the profile
µ = αρ+ `[pix1 + pix2 + · · ·+ pixj ].
By our choice of ρ we know that
f(αρ+ `pix1) = FM(αρ+ `pix1) = FM(ρ) ∪ {x1}.
Using consistency and Lemma 3.23,
f
(
`[pix2 + · · ·+ pixj ]
)
= {x2, . . . , xj}.
Using consistency and the fact that x2, x3 ∈ FM(ρ) we get
f(µ) = f(αρ+ `pix1) ∩ f
(
`[pix2 + · · ·+ pixj ]
) ⊇ {x2, x3}.
Next, using consistency and Lemma 2, we get
f
(
`[pix1 + · · ·+ pixj ]
)
= {x1, . . . , xj}.
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Since x3 ∈ f(ρ) = f(αρ) and x3 ∈ f
(
`[pix1 + · · ·+ pixj ]
)
it follows that
f(µ) = f(αρ) ∩ f (`[pix1 + · · ·+ pixj ]) .
Since x2 6∈ f(ρ) = f(αρ) it follows from the previous equation that x2 6∈ f(µ). But
this contradicts the fact that {x2, x3} ⊆ f(µ). This final contradiction shows that
the set D = {pi ∈ N0 : f(pi) 6= FM(pi)} must be the empty set. Hence f = FM and
we’re done.
3.4 CHARACTERIZING MAJORITY ON RICH BALLOT SPACES
Let |X| ≥ 3. We now introduce a ballot aggregation function onB1 similar to
a function we studied Section 2.3. Suppose ≤ is a linear order on X. For any subset
Y ⊆ X, let min(Y ) be the unique element belonging to Y such that min(Y ) ≤ y
for all y ∈ Y . Consider the function g′ : N0B1 → Pne(X) defined by
g′(pi) =

X if FM(pi) = X
{min(FM(pi))} otherwise.
Recall in Section 2.3, we showed that the rule g : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies
consistency and cancellation, it is similar to show that the rule g′ satisfies consis-
tency and cancellation. Since the ballot space is B1, g
′ satisfies faithfulness. Hence
there is no extension of Theorem 2.12 that includes all possible rich ballot spaces.
Using Theorem 3.24, however, we can extend it to a large class of rich ballot spaces.
By Theorem 3.24, the last rich ballot spaces we have to consider are the
2-rich ballot spaces B2 and B1 ∪ B2. We first will introduce some notation and
terminology. Let B be a ballot space. For any profile pi ∈ N0B, the non-minimal
support of pi is defined by
suppnm(pi) = {x ∈ X : v(x, pi) > min v(pi)}.
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We will say that a profile pi is triangular if |suppnm(pi)| = 3 and
max v(pi) + min v(pi) < v(y, pi) + v(z, pi)
for all y 6= z belonging to suppnm(pi). For example, if m ≥ 4 and pi = {x1}+{x2}+
{x3}, then pi is triangular since suppnm(pi) = {x1, x2, x3}, max v(pi) + min v(pi) = 1,
and v(xj, pi) + v(xk, pi) = 2 for all xj 6= xk in suppnm(pi).
Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, B ∈ {B2,B1 ∪B2}, and φ be the permutation on
X defined by φ(x1) = x2, φ(x2) = x3, φ(x3) = x4, and φ(x4) = x1. Define the rule
f4 : N0B → Pne(X) by
f4(pi) =
 {φ(x`)} if pi is triangular and {x`} = X \ suppnm(pi)FM(pi) otherwise.
Example 3.1. Consider the profile pi = pi{x1,x2} + pi{x2,x3} + pi{x3,x1}, then pi is tri-
angular and suppnm(pi) = {x1, x2, x3}. In this case, {x4} = X \ suppnm(pi) and
so
f4(pi) = {φ(x4)} = {x1}.
Observe that FM(pi) = {x1, x2, x3} and so g(pi) 6= FM(pi).
Since FM satisfies faithfulness and cancellation it follows that the rule f4
satisfies faithfulness and cancellation. The difficulty arises when showing why the
rule f4 satisfies consistency.
Lemma 3.25. The rule f4 satisfies the condition of consistency.
Proof. Let pi and ρ be profiles such that f4(pi)∩f4(ρ) 6= ∅. We may assume without
loss of generality that
x1 ∈ f4(pi) ∩ f4(ρ).
We will consider three case.
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Case 1. Assume that pi and ρ are triangular. Since pi is triangular and
x1 ∈ f4(pi) it follows that f4(pi) = {x1} and suppnm(pi) = {x1, x2, x3}. Therefore,
min v(pi) = v(x4, pi) and
v(xi, pi) + v(x4, pi) ≤ max v(pi) + min v(pi) < v(xj, pi) + v(xk, pi)
whenever {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}. Similarly, f4(ρ) = {x1}, min v(ρ) = v(x4, ρ), and
v(xi, ρ) + v(x4, ρ) < v(xj, ρ) + v(xk, ρ)
whenever {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}. Notice that min v(pi+ρ) = v(x4, pi+ρ) and suppnm(pi+
ρ) = {x1, x2, x3}. Choose i ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that max v(pi + ρ) = v(xi, pi + ρ). Then
max v(pi + ρ) + min v(pi + ρ) = v(xi, pi + ρ) + v(x4, pi + ρ)
= (v(xi, pi) + v(x4, pi)) + (v(xi, ρ) + v(x4, ρ))
< (v(xj, pi) + v(xk, pi)) + (v(xj, ρ) + v(xk, ρ))
= v(xj, pi + ρ) + v(xk, pi + ρ)
for all j 6= k in {1, 2, 3}. Hence pi + ρ is triangular and f4(pi + ρ) = {x1} =
f4(pi) ∩ f4(ρ).
Case 2. Assume that both pi and ρ are not triangular. Then f4(pi) = FM(pi)
and f4(ρ) = FM(ρ). Now x1 ∈ f4(pi) ∩ f4(ρ) implies that
v(x1, pi) = max v(pi) and v(x1, ρ) = max v(ρ).
Thus, max v(pi + ρ) = v(x1, pi + ρ).
Assume that there exist j 6= k in {2, 3, 4} such that
v(x1, pi) + min v(pi) < v(xj, pi) + v(xk, pi)
and keep in mind that v(x1, pi) = max v(pi). Since v(x1, pi) ≥ v(xj, pi) and v(x1, pi) ≥
v(xk, pi) it follows that v(xj, pi) > min v(pi) and v(xk, pi) > min v(pi). Therefore,
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suppnm = {x1, xj, xk}. Moreover, max v(pi) + min v(pi) < v(x1, pi) + v(xj, pi) and
max v(pi) + min v(pi) < v(x1, pi) + v(xk, pi). Thus, by assumption,
max v(pi) + min v(pi) < v(xr, pi) + v(xs, pi)
for all xr 6= xs in suppnm(pi). This means that pi is triangular contrary to the
assumption that pi is not triangular. Therefore,
v(x1, pi) + min v(pi) ≥ v(xj, pi) + v(xk, pi)
for all j 6= k in {2, 3, 4}. In a similar way, v(x1, ρ) = max v(ρ) along with ρ not
triangular implies that
v(x1, ρ) + min v(ρ) ≥ v(xj, ρ) + v(xk, ρ)
for all j 6= k in {2, 3, 4}. Since min v(pi + ρ) ≥ min v(pi) + min v(ρ) we have,
max v(pi + ρ) + min v(pi + ρ) = v(x1, pi + ρ) + min v(pi + ρ)
≥ [v(x1, pi) + min v(pi)] + [v(x1, ρ) + min v(ρ)]
≥ [v(xj, pi) + v(xk, pi)] + [v(xj, ρ) + v(xk, ρ)]
= v(xj, pi + ρ) + v(xk, pi + ρ)
for all j 6= k in {2, 3, 4}. It now follows that pi + ρ is not triangular and so
f4(pi + ρ) = FM(pi + ρ) = FM(pi) ∩ FM(ρ) = f4(pi) ∩ f4(ρ).
Case 3. Assume pi is triangular and ρ is not triangular. Since pi is triangular
and x1 ∈ f4(pi) it follows that f4(pi) = {x1}, suppnm(pi) = {x1, x2, x3}, and min
v(pi) = v(x4, pi). Moreover,
max v(pi) + min v(pi) < v(xj, pi) + v(xk, pi)
for all j 6= k in {1, 2, 3}. Therefore,
v(x2, pi) + v(x4, pi) < v(x1, pi) + v(x3, pi) (3.3)
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and
v(x3, pi) + v(x4, pi) < v(x1, pi) + v(x2, pi). (3.4)
Recall from the argument given in Case 2 that v(x1, ρ) = max v(ρ) along with ρ
not triangular implies that
v(x1, ρ) + min v(ρ) ≥ v(xj, ρ) + v(xk, ρ)
for all j 6= k in {2, 3, 4}. Therefore,
v(x1, ρ) + v(x3, ρ) ≥ v(x2, ρ) + v(x4, ρ) (3.5)
and
v(x1, ρ) + v(x2, ρ) ≥ v(x3, ρ) + v(x4, ρ). (3.6)
Adding inequalities (3.3) and (3.5) leads to
v(x2, pi + ρ) + v(x4, pi + ρ) < v(x1, pi + ρ) + v(x3, pi + ρ).
Also, adding inequalities (3.4) and (3.6) gives
v(x3, pi + ρ) + v(x4, pi + ρ) < v(x1, pi + ρ) + v(x2, pi + ρ).
If v(x1, pi + ρ) + v(x4, pi + ρ) < v(x2, pi + ρ) + v(x3, pi + ρ), then pi + ρ is triangular
and f4(pi + ρ) = {x1} = f4(pi) ∩ f4(ρ). Finally, if
v(x1, pi + ρ) + v(x4, pi + ρ) ≥ v(x2, pi + ρ) + v(x3, pi + ρ),
then pi+ ρ is not triangular and x1 ∈ f4(pi+ ρ) = FM(pi+ ρ). In fact, looking at the
last three inequalities we can see that f4(pi + ρ) = {x1} and we’re done. Thus the
rule f4 satisfies the condition of consistency.
The rule f4 satisfies the conditions of faithfulness, consistency, and cancel-
lation. This example shows why neutrality is needed in Fishburn’s theorem when
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the ballot space is either B2 or B1 ∪B2 when m = 4. We now consider the case of
when m ≥ 4.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} with m ≥ 4 and B ∈ {B2,B1 ∪B2}. Let σ : X → X
be a bijective function such that σ(x) 6= x for any x ∈ X. For any profile pi ∈ N0B,
let
pi = pi +
∑
x∈X
[v(x, pi) + v(σ(x), pi)] · pi{x,σ(x)}
and define fσ : N0B → Pne(X) by fσ(pi) = FM(pi) for all profiles pi ∈ N0B.
Example 3.2. Let σ : X → X be the permutation such that σ(xi) = xi+1 for all
i ≤ m with the convention that xm+1 = x1 and consider the profile
pi = pi{x1,x2} + pi{x2,x3} + pi{x1,x3}.
Since v(x, pi) = 2 for x ∈ {x1, x2, x3} and v(x, pi) = 0 for x ∈ X \ {x1, x2, x3}, it














8 if x = x1, x3
10 if x = x2
2 if x = x4, xm and x4 6= xm
4 if x = xm and x4 = xm
0 otherwise.
It follows that fσ(pi) = {x2} 6= FM(pi). However, we will show that fσ satisfies
cancellation, faithfulness, and consistency.
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Lemma 3.26. The rule fσ satisfies the condition of cancellation.
Proof. Let pi ∈ N0B be a profile such that v(x, pi) = v(y, pi) for all x, y ∈ X. By
definition of pi we have that for any x ∈ X that
v(x, pi) = v(x, pi) + [v(x, pi) + v(σ(x), pi)] + [v(σ−1(x), pi) + v(x, pi)]
= 3 · v(x, pi) + v(σ(x), pi) + v(σ−1(x), pi)
= 5 · v(x, pi) by hypothesis.
Hence fσ(pi) = FM(pi) = X and thus fσ satisfies the condition of cancellation.
Lemma 3.27. The rule fσ satisfies the condition of faithfulness.
Proof. We first consider the ballot B = {x}. We have for x ∈ X and pi ∈ N0B that,
v(x, pi) = v(x, pi) + [v(x, pi) + v(σ(x), pi)] +
[
v(σ−1(x), pi) + v(x, pi)
]
= 3 · v(x, pi) + v(σ(x), pi) + v(σ−1(x), pi).


















We now consider |B| = 2. Without loss of generality, suppose that B =
{x1, xi} with i > 1. We first consider the case that xi ∈ {x2, xm}, it follows that
if xi = x2 then σ(xi) = x3 and σ
−1(xi) = x1 and if xi = xm then σ(xi) = x1 and




















































for j 6= 1, 2.










Now consider the case that xi /∈ {x2, xm}. It follows that xi−1 6= x1, xm−1




















































for j 6= 1, 2.









Lemma 3.28. The rule fσ satisfies the condition of consistency.
Proof. To prove the consistency of fσ suppose that pi and ρ are profiles such that
fσ(pi) ∩ fσ(ρ) 6= ∅. We will first observe that
pi + ρ = (pi + ρ) +
∑
x∈X
[v(x, pi + ρ) + v(σ(x), pi + ρ)] pi{x,σ(x)}
= (pi + ρ) +
∑
x∈X
[(v(x, pi) + v(x, ρ)) + (v(σ(x), pi) + v(σ(x) + ρ))] pi{x,σ(x)}
= pi + ρ+
∑
x∈X




[v(x, pi) + v(σ(x), pi)]pi{x,σ(x)} + ρ+
∑
x∈X
[v(x, ρ) + v(σ(x), ρ)] pi{x,σ(x)}
= pi + ρ̂
Using this fact along with consistency of FM we have that




= FM (pi + ρ̂)
= FM (pi) ∩ FM (ρ̂)
= fσ(pi) ∩ fσ(ρ).
Hence fσ satisfies the condition of consistency.
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Using the three previous lemmas along with Example 3.2 we see that neu-
trality is necessary to characterize FM on the rich ballot spacesB1,B2, andB1∪B2
when m ≥ 4.
The remaining ballot spaces to consider occur when m = 2 and m = 3.
Lemma 3.29. For m = 2 and B a rich ballot space, f : N0B → Pne(X) satisfies
faithfulness, consistency, and cancellation if and only if f = FM .
Proof. Since m = 2, X = {x, y}. Consider the case where pi is a profile such that
that v(x, pi) = v(y, pi). By cancellation, f(pi) = X which agrees with FM(pi). Now
suppose pi is a profile such that v(x, pi) 6= v(y, pi), without loss of generality we will
assume that v(x, pi) > v(y, pi). Since B is a rich ballot space with m = 2 it follows
by the separation condition that B1 ⊆ B. Let l = v(x, pi)− v(y, pi) > 0. By way of
contradiction suppose y ∈ f(pi). By faithfulness and consistency, we have that
f(pi + l · pi{y}) = {y}.
However, observe that v(x, pi + l · pi{y}) = v(y, pi + l · pi{y}) and thus by cancellation
f(pi+ l ·pi{y}) = {x, y} contrary to f(pi+ l ·pi{y}) = {y}. Since f(pi) 6= ∅ we have that
f(pi) = {x} which agrees with FM(pi). Thus f(pi) = FM(pi) for all profiles pi.
When m = 3 the remaining ballot spaces to consider are B2 and B1 ∪B2.
Observe that when m = 3, m − 1 = 2 and thus by Theorem 3.19 we have that
neutrality is not needed to characterize majority rule on B2. We now consider the
final rich ballot space.
While the following lemma is a consequence of Alo´s-Ferrer [2], we include a
proof for completeness.
Lemma 3.30. For m = 3 and B = B1 ∪B2, f : N0B → Pne(X) satisfies faithful-
ness, consistency, and cancellation if and only if f = FM .
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Proof. Let pi ∈ N0B1∪B2 be a fixed profile and without loss of generality let
v(x1, pi) ≥ v(x2, pi) ≥ v(x3, pi).
Define the profile pˆi = pi{x1}+pi{x2}+pi{x3} and observe that v(x, pi) = 1 for all x ∈ X
and thus by cancellation we have f (pˆi) = X. Let α = v(x1, pi) − v(x2, pi) ≥ 0 and
β = v(x2, pi)− v(x3, pi) ≥ 0. Consider the new profile
ρ = v(x3, pi) · pˆi + β · pi{x1,x2} + α · pi{x1},
and observe that
v(x1, ρ) = v(x3, pi) + β + α = v(x3, pi) + v(x2, pi)− v(x3, pi) + v(x1, pi)− v(x2, pi)
= v(x1, pi),
v(x2, ρ) = v(x3, pi) + β = v(x3, pi) + v(x2, pi)− v(x3, pi) = v(x2, pi), and
v(x3, ρ) = v(x3, pi).
Since f satisfies consistency and cancellation it follows from Proposition 3.13 that
f is non-deviating and thus f(pi) = f(ρ).
By our hypothesis FM(pi) ∈ {{x1}, {x1, x2}, {x1, x2, x3}}. We first consider
that FM(pi) = {x1, x2, x3} and hence v(x1, pi) = v(x2, pi) = v(x3, pi) and thus α =
β = 0 and ρ = v(x3, pi) · pˆi. By consistency of f and the fact f (pˆi) = X, we have
f(pi) = f(ρ) = f (v(x3, pi) · pˆi) = f (pˆi) = X = FM(pi).
If FM(pi) = {x1, x2}, then v(x1, pi) = v(x2, pi) > v(x3, pi) and hence α = 0
71
and β > 0. By faithfulness, consistency, and the fact f (pˆi) = X, we have that
f(pi) = f(ρ) = f
(
v(x3, pi) · pˆi + β · pi{x1,x2}
)




= X ∩ {x1, x2}
= {x1, x2}
= FM(pi).
Finally we consider the case that FM(pi) = {x1}. We now have v(x1, pi) >
v(x2, pi) ≥ v(x3, pi) and thus α > 0. We will suppose β > 0, then by faithfulness,
consistency, and the fact f (pˆi) = X, we have
f(pi) = f(ρ) = f
(
v(x3, pi) · pˆi + β · pi{x1,x2} + α · pi{x1}
)








= X ∩ {x1, x2} ∩ {x1}
= {x1}
= FM(pi).
A similar argument takes care of the case where β = 0. Hence for m = 3 and
B = B1∪B2, f : N0B → Pne(X) satisfies faithfulness, consistency, and cancellation
if and only if f = FM .
As a result of the previous propositions, lemmas, and theorems we can now
state the main result of this dissertation. This Theorem is a complete characteri-
zation of all rich ballot spaces in which the condition of neutrality can be dropped
and still characterize majority rule; thus this result is a bridge between the results
of Fishburn and Alo´s-Ferrer.
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Theorem 3.31.
1. The majority rule is the only rule fulfilling faithfulness, cancellation, and con-
sistency in any rich ballot space B of 2 alternatives.
2. The majority rule is the only rule fulfilling faithfulness, cancellation, and con-
sistency in any rich ballot space B of 3 alternatives if and only if B 6= B1.
3. The majority rule is the only rule fulfilling faithfulness, cancellation, and con-
sistency in any rich ballot space B of at least 4 alternatives if and only if
B /∈ {B1,B2,B1 ∪B2}.
Now that we have a complete characterization of all rich ballot spaces in
which the condition of neutrality can be dropped and still characterize majority
rule; the question still remains for which j-rich ballot spaces can we characterize
majority rule without the condition of neutrality.
For the remainder of this chapter we will assume m ≥ 6 and m is even. Given
Theorem 3.24, we may restrict our search to 1-rich and 2-rich ballot spaces which
are not j-rich for j ≥ 3. Two examples of ballot spaces we are considering are the
1-rich and 2-rich ballot spaces B1∪B2∪{x1, x3, x5} and B1∪B2∪B3\{x1, x3, x5}.
We will show we cannot characterize majority rule without neutrality on the first
ballot space. Surprisingly, we have the following conjecture:
Conjecture 3.1. There is a function defined on the ballot space B1 ∪B2 ∪B3 \
{x1, x3, x5} satisfying the conditions of faithfulness, cancellation, and consistency
other than majority rule.
To motivate why we believe this conjecture to be true, we will introduce the
following two non-permutation closed ballot spaces
Bodd = {B ⊆ X : i odd ∀ xi ∈ B} and
Beven = {B ⊆ X : i even ∀ xi ∈ B}.
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Recall the function fσ from Example 3.2, we will be considering fσ : N0B → Pne(X)
where B = B1 ∪B2 ∪Bodd ∪Beven. In Lemma 3.26 we showed that fσ satisfies
the condition of cancellation for any ballot space B, similarly in Lemma 3.28 we
showed that fσ satisfies the condition of consistency for any ballot space B. It is
left to show that fσ is faithful. We will first motivate this by an example.
Example 3.3. We will suppose that m = 6 and consider the profile pi{x1,x3,x5} and
so




3 if x = x1, x3, x5
2 if x = x2, x4, x6.









= {x1, x3, x5}.
Lemma 3.32. The rule fσ defined on the ballot space B1 ∪ B2 ∪ Bodd ∪ Beven
satisfies the condition of faithfulness.
Proof. By Lemma 3.27 we have that fσ(B) = B for all B ∈ B1 ∪B2. It is left to










along with the convention that σ(xi) is even (odd) means that σ(xi) = xi+1 where
i+ 1 is even (odd). Moreover, σ(xm) = x1 is odd with m even. Since m is even we
have that if i is even (odd), then σ(xi) and σ
−1(xi) is odd (even).




with i even. Since i is even










Now consider xi ∈ B. Since i is odd, we have σ(xi) and σ−1(xi) are even and
hence v (σ(xi), piB) + v (σ





= 3 · v (xi, piB) = 3.
Finally consider xi /∈ B with i odd. Similar to above we have that v (σ(xi), piB)+









= 3 if x ∈ B, and v (x, piB) ≤ 2 otherwise.
Hence






A similar argument works to show that fσ (piB) = B for B ∈ Beven. Hence




RESTRICTED BALLOT AGGREGATION RULES
In Chapter 3, we considered the model where we restrict voters to approve
of ballots from a set of admissible ballots. We now consider the case that the set of
admissible ballots are the possible committees to be formed.
In this model any voter of the electorate may choose any committee they
approve of from the collection of possible committees, the function will collectively
aggregate every voters approval committee into one of the possible committees.
Thus the class of aggregation rules we will be modeling in this chapter are of the
form:
f : N0B → B \ {∅}.
Since these functions are ballot aggregation rules with a restriction on the social
outcome, we refer to this class of rules as restricted ballot aggregation rules.
The following example shows why majority rule may not be well defined.
Example 4.1. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} and consider the ballot space B = B1 ∪
{∅, X}. Observe that FM : N0B → B \ {∅} is not well defined. To see this, consider
for the profile pi = pi{x1} + pi{x2} we have that {x : v(x, pi) ≥ v(y, pi) ∀y ∈ X} =
{x1, x2} /∈ B.
Since Majority Rule is not well-defined on this space we will adjust the
definitions and axioms as needed for this new model of aggregation functions. To
do so we will first introduce a new set of tools to help us.
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For any two ballots B1, B2, we say
B1 ≤ B2 if B1 ⊆ B2
Thus we have a partial order, on our ballot space. Hence when considering working
with such functions we will choose to view the ballot space as a partially ordered
set (or poset).
In 1990 Monjardet [4] began the first construction of an abstract axiomatic
theory of consensus functions in order to account for several classes of similar con-
crete results in the domain of the axiomatic approach to consensus. In this chapter
we will discuss characterizing the approval voting rule on lattices under the latticial
framework of Monjardet. Before we begin we will introduce some preliminaries from
the theory of partially ordered sets.
Once we have developed the framework to introduce our model, it will be
our goal to see when we can generalize the three main characterizations of approval
voting from Chapter 2. The main characterizations of approval voting are:
1. Theorem 2.10. A rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies faithfulness, consis-
tency, and is non-deviating if and only if f is the approval voting rule.
2. Theorem 2.12. A rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies faithfulness, consis-
tency, and cancellation if and only if f is the approval voting rule.
3. Theorem 2.15. A rule f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies neutrality, consistency,
cancellation, and is discerning if and only if f is the approval voting rule.
In Section 4.3 we will present a generalization of Theorem 2.10 to offer a
characterization using the conditions of faithfulness, consistency, and non-deviating
to include all distributive lattices. In this section we will also show that we cannot
extend Theorem 2.15 to include all distributive lattices.
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Next in Section 4.4 we first show we can extend our result to include ana-
logues of Theorem 2.12 and Theorem 2.15 to include boolean lattices. We then
conclude the Chapter with a conjecture about a class of distributive classes.
4.1 PRELIMINARIES
Before we begin working with aggregation functions on lattices, we start by
providing the definitions of some necessary terms as well as some well-known results.
Much of this can be found in reference [5] or other introductory books on order. For
the purposes of this dissertation, we will assume the lattices we refer to are finite
lattices unless otherwise stated.
For a non-empty set P , a partial order on P is a binary relation ≤ on P that
is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. That is, for all x, y, z in P ,
(i) x ≤ x,
(ii) x ≤ y and y ≤ x imply x = y,
(iii) x ≤ y and y ≤ z imply x ≤ z.
A set P equipped with a partial order is called a partially ordered set, or
poset for short and is denoted by (P,≤). Furthermore, P is said to have a bottom
element 0 if for all x ∈ P , 0 ≤ x and a top element 1 if for all x ∈ P , x ≤ 1. Let
x < y denote the case that x ≤ y and y 6≤ x. We say that x covers y in the poset
if y < x and there is no z with y < z < x.
We use the language partial to imply that not all elements are related by this
relationship. If x 6≤ y and y 6≤ x, then we say that x and y are non-comparable
and denote it x||y. A poset in which every two elements are related is called a
totally ordered set. For example, any non-empty subset of real numbers R with
the standard order, is a totally ordered set.
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Given any subset S of a poset P , the join of S is the supremum (or least
upper bound) and denoted,
∨
S, if it exists. Similarly the meet of S is the infimum
(or greatesest lower bound) and denoted,
∧
S. If S = {x1, . . . , xn} we denote∨
S = x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xn and
∧
S = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn. Although the meet and join need not
exist, for our purposes we want to consider the case in which it does. A partially
ordered set P is called a lattice if for all x, y ∈ P x ∨ y ∈ P and x ∧ y ∈ P and in
this case we denote P = L. Note, in the case we have that L is a finite lattice, we
have that
∨ ∅ = 0 and ∧ ∅ = 1.
Let L be a lattice. An element x ∈ L is meet-irreducible if x 6= 1 and
x = a∧b implies x = a or x = b for all a, b ∈ L. Similarly x ∈ L is join-irreducible
if x 6= 0 and x = a ∨ b implies x = a or x = b for all a, b ∈ L. We let J(L) be the
set of all join-irreducible elements of L and M(L) be the set of all meet-irreducible
elements L.
The notion of join-irreducibles give us a nice lemma involving equivalence
of elements in a lattice. It is well known that every element in a finite lattice L
is the join of all the join-irreducibles less than or equal to it. This leads us to the
following proposition, a proof of which can be found in any introductory text on
partially ordered sets.
Lemma 4.1. For any finite lattice L and x, y ∈ L,
x = y ⇐⇒ [j ≤ x ⇐⇒ j ≤ y for all j ∈ J(L)].
We now will consider a special class of lattices. A lattice L is said to be
distributive if it satisfies the distributive law, that is, for all a, b, c ∈ L, we have
a∧(b∨c) = (a∧b)∨(a∧c) and a∨(b∧c) = (a∨b)∧(a∨c). The topic of distributivity
of lattice leads us to two very important well known facts about distributive lattices.
Lemma 4.2. For any distributive lattice L, if j ≤ x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xn with j ∈ J(L).
Then j ≤ xi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Proof. Suppose that j ≤ x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xn, and observe that since j ≤ j we have by the
definition of meet that
j = j ∧ (x1 ∨ · · · ∨ xn)
= (j ∧ x1) ∨ · · · ∨ (j ∧ xn) by distributivity.
By the definition of join irreducible we have that that j = j ∧ xi for some xi. Thus
by the definition of meet we have that j ≤ xi.
To introduce the next important fact about distributive lattices we first es-
tablish definitions of two classes of lattices. The lattice Mn has a bottom element
0, a top element 1, and n elements a1, . . . an such that ai||aj for all i, j where i 6= j.
The lattice Nk has a bottom element 0, a top element 1, k − 3 elements such that
b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bk3, and then a single element denoted a that is non-comparable to
any bi.
In this dissertation we will sometimes define a lattice by its Hasse Diagram.
A Hasse Diagram is a graphical representation of the relation of elements of a
partially ordered set with an implied upward orientation. A point is drawn for each
element of the partially ordered set and joined with the line segment according to
the following rules:
1. If p < q in the poset, then the point corresponding to p appears lower in the
drawing then the point corresponding to q.
2. The two points p and q will be joined by a line segment if and only if p covers
q or q covers p.
Hasse Diagrams of Mn and Nk can be found in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, respec-
tively. It is well known that the lattices Mn and Nk are not distributive.
We now introduce an important class of distributive lattices. In a lattice L
with 0 and 1, y is a complement of x if x ∧ y = 0 and x ∨ y = 1. A boolean
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Example 4.2. For the boolean lattice M2 = {0, a, b, 1}, we have 0 < a < 1 and
0 < b < 1 with a||b. We also have the following tables of joins of any 2 elements of
M2, and the meets of any 2 elements of M2.
Table 4.1: Joins of M2
0 a b 1
0 0 a b 1
a a a 1 1
b b 1 b 1
1 1 1 1 1
Table 4.2: Meets of M2
0 a b 1
0 0 0 0 0
a 0 a 0 a
b 0 0 b b
1 0 a b 1
4.2 APPROVAL VOTING ON LATTICES
Let L be a finite lattice, and let J(L) be the set of join-irreducibles of L.
Moreover, we will require |J(L)| ≥ 2. Let Lk be the set of all k-tuples of L. A
k-tuple (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Lk is called a profile on L of length k and we denote the






The type of functions we are considering will be of the form
f : L∗ → L.
We will refer to this class of functions as aggregation functions on L or aggre-
gation rules on L.
For a profile pi = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ L∗ and join irreducible s ∈ J(L) we let,
Ks(pi) = {i : s ≤ xi}.
Note that if pi is a profile such that Ks(pi) = ∅ for all join irreducibles s ∈ J(L),
then x1 = · · · = xk = 0. In this case we will call pi a zero profile. An example is
the profile consisting of a single voter casting the ballot 0.
Lemma 4.3. For any profile pi ∈ L∗ and join irreducibles j, j′ ∈ J(L),
j ≤ j′ ⇒ |Kj′(pi)| ≤ |Kj(pi)|.
Proof. Suppose j ≤ j′, it follows that Kj(pi) ⊆ Kj′(pi) and hence we have |Kj′(pi)| ≤
|Kj(pi)| as was desired.





{j ∈ J(L) : |Kj(pi)| ≥ n/2}.
However this version of majority rule doesn’t fit with the one we have in this dis-
sertation, thus we will provide a new version that agrees with the model we have
discussed. The approval set with respect to the profile pi is defined by
A(pi) = {s ∈ J(L) : |Ks(pi)| ≥ |Ks′(pi)| ∀ s′ ∈ J(L)}.
Using this, the approval voting rule is the aggregation rule FA : L
∗ → L defined





Observe that for any profile pi, A(pi) 6= ∅ and thus FA(pi) 6= 0. Furthermore, in the
case that pi is a zero profile, A(pi) = J(L) and thus FA(pi) =
∨
J(L) = 1.
Example 4.3. For L = M2 (Figure 4.1), we have J(M2) = {a, b} and consider the
profile pi = (0, a, b, 1). We have Ka(pi) = {2, 4} and Kb(pi) = {3, 4}, and it follows





Proposition 4.4. For L a distributive lattice and any j ∈ J(L) the following holds,
j ≤ FA(pi) ⇐⇒ j ∈ A(pi).
Proof. Let L be a distributive lattice and suppose that j ∈ A(pi) for some j ∈ J(L).
By definition of FA we have that j ≤
∨
A(pi) = FA(pi).
Now suppose L is a distributive lattice and suppose j ≤ FA(pi) for some
j ∈ J(L) \A(pi). It follows that |Kj(pi)| < |Kj′(pi)| for all j′ ∈ A(pi) = {s1, . . . , sn}.
Consider that j ≤ FA(pi) = s1∨· · ·∨sn. Since L is distributive, it follows by Lemma
4.2 that j ≤ si for some si ∈ A(pi). Observe that since j ≤ si it follows by Lemma
4.3 that |Kj(pi)| > |Ksi(pi)| contrary to assumption that j /∈ A(pi). Therefore it
follows that j ≤ FA(pi) if and only if j ∈ A(pi).
The functions we discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 were implicitly anonymous,
these are not. A function f : L∗ → L is said to be anonymous if for any profile
pi = (x1, . . . , xk) and every permutation σ : Nk → Nk, where Nk = {1, . . . , k},
f(piσ) = f(pi). That is,
f(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(k)) = f(x1, . . . , xk).
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Proposition 4.5. The approval voting rule satisfies the condition of anonymity.
Proof. Suppose pi is a zero profile, then given any permutation σ, piσ is also a zero
profile. Thus it follows by definition of FA that FA(pi) = 1 = FA(pi
σ).
Now suppose pi is a nonzero profile and σ : N|pi| → N|pi| is a permutation.
Consider that,
A(pi) = {s ∈ J(L) : |Ks(pi)| ≥ |Ks′(pi)| ∀ s′ ∈ J(L)}









Hence the approval voting rule satisfies the condition of anonymity.
A function f : L∗ → L is said to be consistent if for all profiles pi =
(x1, . . . , xk) and pi
′ = (y1, . . . , yj),
f(pi) ∧ f(pi′) 6= 0⇒ f(pipi′) = f(pi) ∧ f(pi′),
where pipi′ is the profile where you start with the elements from the profile pi and
end with the elements from the profile pi′. That is,
pipi′ = (x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yj).
Proposition 4.6. For any distributive lattice, the approval voting rule is consistent.
Proof. Let L be a distributive lattice and let pi and pi′ be profiles such that FA(pi)∧
FA(pi
′) 6= 0. First observe that for any join irreducible j ∈ J(L),
|Kj(pipi′)| = |Kj(pi)|+ |Kj(pi′)|.
We will first show that j ≤ FA(pipi′)⇒ j ≤ FA(pi) ∧ FA(pi′) for all j ∈ J(L).
Let j ∈ J(L) such that j ≤ FA(pipi′). Hence it follows by Proposition 4.4 that
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j ∈ A(pipi′). By way of contradiction suppose that j 6≤ FA(pi). Since FA(pi) 6= 0 and
FA(pi) ∧ FA(pi′) 6= 0, there exists s ∈ J(L) such that s ≤ FA(pi) ∧ FA(pi′). Hence
s ≤ FA(pi) and thus |Ks(pi)| > |Kj(pi)|. Given |Kj(pipi′)| ≥ |Ks(pipi′)| it follows that
|Kj(pi)|+ |Kj(pi′)| ≥ |Ks(pi)|+ |Ks(pi′)|
|Kj(pi′)| ≥ |Ks(pi′)|+ |Ks(pi)| − |Kj(pi)|
|Kj(pi′)| > |Ks(pi′)| since |Ks(pi)| − |Kj(pi)| > 0,
contrary to s ≤ FA(pi). Thus j ≤ FA(pi) ∧ FA(pi′).
Now we will show that if j ≤ FA(pi) ∧ FA(pi′) then j ≤ FA(pipi′) for all
j ∈ J(L). Let j ∈ J(L) such that j ≤ FA(pi) ∧ FA(pi′). By definition of meet,
j ≤ FA(pi) and j ≤ FA(pi′). Hence it follows by Proposition 4.4 that j ∈ A(pi) and
j ∈ A(pi′).
Given j ∈ A(pi) and j ∈ A(pi′), it follows that |Kj(pi)| ≥ |Kj′(pi)| for all
j′ ∈ J(L). Similarly that |Kj(pi′)| ≥ |Kj′(pi′)| for all j′ ∈ J(L). Observe that,
|Kj(pipi′)| = |Kj(pi)|+ |Kj(pi′)|
≥ |Kj′(pi)|+ |Kj′(pi′)| ∀ j′ ∈ J(L)
= |Kj(pipi′)|.
Thus it follows that j ∈ A(pipi′). Therefore by Proposition 4.4 j ≤ FA(pipi′).
Hence it follows by Lemma 4.1 that FA(pipi
′) = FA(pi) ∧ FA(pi′) and thus FA
satisfies consistency.
We will now show that Proposition 4.6 does not hold for the non-distributive
lattices Mn for n ≥ 3.
Example 4.4. Let n ≥ 3 and consider approval voting defined on Mn (Figure
4.2). Let pi = (a1, a2) and let ρ = (a1, a3). Observe that FA(pi) =
∨{a1, a2} = 1,
FA(pi) =
∨{a1, a3} = 1, and FA(piρ) = ∨{a1} = a1. Therefore we have that
1 = FA(pi) ∧ FA(ρ) 6= FA(piρ) = a1.
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And thus approval voting on Mn violates the condition of consistency.
Based on the previous proposition and example we offer the following con-
jecture:
Conjecture 4.1. If FA is consistent on a finite lattice L, then L is distributive.
Here is a nice generalization of the discerning condition introduced by Duddy
& Piggins [6]: a function f : L∗ → L is said to be discerning if for all profiles pi,
and all s ∈ J(L),
(i) If |Ks(pi)| > |Ks′(pi)| for all s′ ∈ J(L) \ {s}, then s ≤ f(pi).
(ii) If |Ks(pi)| < |Ks′(pi)| for all s′ ∈ J(L) \ {s}, then s 6≤ f(pi).
Proposition 4.7. For any lattice, the approval voting rule satisfies the first condi-
tion of discerning.
Proof. To show that FA satisfies the first condition of discerning, consider a profile
pi such that |Ks(pi)| > |Ks′(pi)| for all s′ ∈ J(L) \ {s}. Therefore, s ∈ A(pi) and so
s ≤ ∨A(pi) = FA(pi). In fact, A(pi) = {s} and FA(pi) = s. Therefore, FA satisfies
the first condition of discerning on any finite lattice L.
Proposition 4.8. For any distributive lattice, the approval voting rule satisfies the
second condition of discerning.
Proof. Let L be a distributive lattice. Suppose pi is a profile such that |Ks(pi)| <
|Ks′(pi)| for all s′ ∈ J(L)\{s}. Then s /∈ A(pi) and so by Proposition 4.4, s 6≤ FA(pi).
Consider the Non-Distributive Lattice Mn for n ≥ 3.
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1a1 a2 . . . an
0
Figure 4.2: Mn
Non-Distributive for n ≥ 3
Lemma 4.9. The rule FA defined on Mn for n ≥ 3 violates condition (ii) of dis-
cerning.
Proof. Given the profile pi = (a2, . . . , an), |Ka1(pi)| = 0 < |Kai(pi)| = 1 for all
ai ∈ {a2, . . . , an} = J(L)\{a1}. By the definition of FA, FA(pi) =
∨{a2, . . . , an} = 1
hence a1 ≤ 1 so FA does not satisfy condition (ii) of Discerning.









Nondistributive for k ≥ 5
Lemma 4.10. The rule FA defined on Nk for k ≥ 5 violates condition (ii) of
Discerning.
Proof. Given the profile pi = (a, bk−4), consider that |Kbk−3(pi)| = 0 < |Kx(pi)| = 1
for all x ∈ {a, b1, . . . , bk−4} = J(L) \ {bk−3}. By the definition of FA, FA(pi) =
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∨{a, b1, . . . , bk−4} = 1 hence bk−3 ≤ 1 and so FA does not satisfy condition (ii) of
discerning.
By Proposition 4.8 and the two previous lemmas we are left with the following
conjecture:
Conjecture 4.2. The approval voting rule on a lattice L is discerning if and only
if L is distributive.
A function f : L∗ → L is said to be non-deviating if for any pi, pi′ ∈ L∗
such that |Kj(pi)| = |Kj(pi′)| for all j ∈ J(L) then f(pi) = f(pi′)
Proposition 4.11. The FA rule satisfies the condition of non-deviating.
Proof. Suppose pi and pi′ are profiles such that |Kj(pi)| = |Kj(pi′)| for all j ∈ J(L).





Hence the FA rule is non-deviating.
A function f : L∗ → L is said to satisfy cancellation if for all profiles pi, if
|Ks(pi)| = |Ks′(pi)| for all s, s′ ∈ J(L) then f(pi) = 1.
Proposition 4.12. The FA rule satisfies the condition of cancellation.
Proof. Let pi be a profile such that |Ks(pi)| = |Ks′(pi)| for all join irreducibles s, s′ ∈
J(L). Then A(pi) = J(L) and it follows from the definition of FA that FA(pi) =∨
A(pi) = 1, thus FA satisfies cancellation.
Another nice generalization of our previous axioms is the extension of neu-
trality to latticial models of consensus. A function f : L∗ → L is said to be
neutral if for any profiles pi and pi′ and for any permutation σ : J(L) → J(L) if
Ks(pi) = Kσ(s)(pi
′) for all join irreducibles s ∈ J(L) then
j ≤ f(pi) for some j ∈ J(L)⇒ σ(j) ≤ f(pi′).
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Proposition 4.13. For any distributive lattice, the approval voting rule satisfies
neutrality.
Proof. Suppose pi and pi′ are profiles, and σ : J(L) → J(L) is a permutation such
that Ks(pi) = Kσ(s)(pi
′) for all join irreducibles s ∈ J(L). Observe that σ[A(pi)] =
A(pi′).
Suppose j ≤ FA(pi), given the rule is defined on a distributive lattice, then it
follows by Proposition 4.4 that j ∈ A(pi). Therefore σ(j) ∈ A(pi′) and thus σ(j) ≤
FA(pi
′). Thus the rule FA defined on a distributive lattice satisfies Neutrality.





x where pi{x} = (x).
Proposition 4.14. The approval voting rule satisfies the condition of faithfulness.










= x. Hence the approval voting rule satisfies the condition
of faithfulness.
4.3 CHARACTERIZING APPROVAL VOTING ON DISTRIBUTIVE
LATTICES
To begin our first characterization of the approval voting rule on the latticial
model we first introduce a key property the previous models of consensus had. A
function f : L∗ → L is said to be productive if for all profiles pi, f(pi) 6= 0.
Observe that since A(pi) 6= ∅ for any profile pi, it follows that the approval voting
rule is indeed productive.
1We define faithfulness to be consistent with our definition of faithful in the model of Chapter
2. However, this is different from the well establish definition of faithfulness on the latticial model
which requires f(0) = 0.
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We now state and prove the main result of Chapter 4. This is a generalization
of Theorem 2.10.
Theorem 4.15. The aggregation function f : L∗ → L on a distributive lattice,
satisfies productivity, consistency, faithfulness, and non-deviating if and only if f =
FA.
Proof. We have shown that FA defined on a distributive lattice satisfies productivity,
consistency, faithfulness, and non-deviating. It is left to show that if f : L∗ → L
satisfies productivity, consistency, faithfulness, and non-deviating; then f = FA.
Let pi be a zero profile, by productiveness we have that f(pi) 6= 0. By
faithfulness we have that f(1) = 1. So observe that by consistency we have that
0 6= f(pi) = f(pi) ∧ 1 = f(pi) ∧ f(1) = f(pi1).
Since pi is a zero profile, we have by non-deviating that f(pi1) = f(1) = 1. Hence
f(pi) = 1 as was desired.
Now let pi be a fixed non-zero profile. Since pi is non-zero, the integer l =
|Kj(pi)| for j ∈ A(pi) is strictly greater than 0. For each integer t in the interval
[1, l] let






{j ∈ J(L) : Kj(pi) 6= ∅} and bl = FA(pi).
Also notice that
bj1 ≤ bj2 if j1 ≥ j2.
Consider the profile
pi∗ = (b1, . . . , bl).
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Since f is faithful, it follows that f (bj) = bj for j = 1, · · · , l. Therefore,
∧
{f(bj) : j ∈ [1, l]} =
∧
{bj : j ∈ [1, l]} = bl 6= 0.
Since f satisfies consistency we get
f(pi∗) =
∧
{f(bj) : j ∈ [1, l]} = bl = FM(pi).
Thus f(pi∗) = FA(pi).
For each s ∈ J(X), s ≤ bj if and only if j = 1, 2, · · · , |Ks(pi)| and so
|Ks(pi∗)| = |Ks(pi)|. Since f satisfies non-deviating it follows that f(pi∗) = f(pi).
Hence f(pi) = FA(pi) and we’re done.
Theorem 2.15 in Chapter 2, we characterized approval voting with the ax-
ioms of productivity, neutrality, consistency, cancellation, and discerning. We will
show that on the latticial model we cannot extend this characterization to include
distributive lattices.







Define f : L∗ → L by,
f(pi) =

an−1 if an−1 ∈ pi
1 otherwise.
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Lemma 4.16. The rule f satisfies productivity.
Proof. For any profile pi ∈ L∗ we have that f(pi) ∈ {an−1, 1}. Hence the rule f
satisfies the condition of productivity.
Lemma 4.17. The rule f satisfies neutrality.
Proof. To show f satisfies Neutrality, suppose pi and pi′ are profiles such that given
σ : J(X)→ J(X), Ks(pi) = Kσ(s)(pi′) for all join irreducibles s ∈ J(X).
By way of contradiction suppose that
j ≤ f(pi) and σ(j) 6≤ f(pi′)
Observe that σ(j) = 1 and f(pi′) = an−1. Since f(pi′) = an−1 it follows that
|K1(pi′)| < |Kan−1(pi′)| ≤ |Kai(pi′)| for all i ≤ n− 1
But since Ks(pi) = Kσ(s)(pi
′) it follows that
|Kσ−1(1)(pi′)| < |Kσ−1(an−1)(pi′)| ≤ |Kσ−1(ai)(pi′)| for all i ≤ n− 1
Observe that since a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ an ≤ 1 for all profiles pi we have that
|K1(pi)| ≤ |Kan(pi)| ≤ . . . ≤ |Ka2(pi)| ≤ |Ka1(pi)|.
It follows that σ(1) = 1 and σ(an−1) = an−1, and thus 1 = j 6≤ f(pi) = an−1 a
contradiction. Thus f satisfies neutrality.
Lemma 4.18. The rule f satisfies consistency.
Proof. Let pi, pi′ ∈ L∗ such that f(pi) ∧ f(pi′) 6= 0. First consider the case that
an−1 /∈ pi and an−1 /∈ pi′, it follows that an−1 /∈ pipi′. It now follows from the
definition of f that f(pi) = 1, f(pi′) = 1, and f(pipi′) = 1, thus we have
f(pi) ∧ f(pi′) = 1 ∧ 1 = 1 = f(pipi′).
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Now consider the case that an−1 ∈ pi or an−1 ∈ pi′, without loss of generality
we will assume that an−1 ∈ pi and it follows that an−1 ∈ pipi′. By definition of f we
have that f(pi) = an−1, f(pi′) ∈ {an−1, 1}, and f(pipi′) = an−1, thus we have
f(pi) ∧ f(pi′) = an−1 ∧ f(pi′) = an−1 = f(pipi′).
Hence we have that the rule f satisfies consistency.
Lemma 4.19. The rule f satisfies the condition of discerning.
Proof. To show f satisfies discerning, we first consider a profile pi where there exists
s ∈ J(X) such that |Ks(pi)| < |Ks′(pi)| ∀ s′ ∈ J(X) \ {s}. Observe that since
a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ an ≤ 1 for all profiles pi we have that
|K1(pi)| ≤ |Kan(pi)| ≤ . . . ≤ |Ka2(pi)| ≤ |Ka1(pi)|.
It follows that s = 1 and s′ = an, observe the only way this can happen is if an−1 ∈ pi
and thus f(pi) = an−1 with 1 6≤ f(pi).
We now consider a profile pi where there exists s ∈ J(X) such that |Ks(pi)| >
|Ks′(pi)| ∀ s′ ∈ J(X) \ {s}. From above we know that s = a1 and thus a1 ≤ f(pi) ∈
{an−1, 1}. It follows that the rule f is discerning.
Lemma 4.20. The rule f satisfies cancellation.
Proof. Let pi ∈ L∗ such that
|K1(pi)| = |Kan(pi)| = . . . = |Ka2(pi)| = |Ka1(pi)|.
The only way that |K1(pi)| = |Kan(pi)| is if an−1 /∈ pi. Hence by the definition of f
we have that f(pi) = 1 and thus f satisfies cancellation.
Based on the previous lemmas, we now know that we cannot characterize
approval voting on the entire class of distributive lattices with the axioms of pro-
ductivity, neutrality, consistency, cancellation, and discerning. Hence Theorem 2.15
cannot be generalized to include all distributive lattices.
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4.4 CHARACTERIZING APPROVAL VOTING ON BOOLEAN LATTICES
In the previous section we showed that FA cannot be characterized with the
conditions of productivity, neutrality, consistency, cancellation and discerning. In
this section we want to consider FA defined on Boolean lattices to show that we can







Figure 4.5: Boolean Lattice on 3 Elements
Proposition 4.21. If a function f : L∗ → L is defined on a boolean lattice satisfying
cancellation and consistency, then f is non-deviating.
Proof. Let f : L∗ → L be a rule satisfying consistency and cancellation. Let
pi and pi′ be profiles such that |Kj(pi)| = |Kj(pi′)| for all j ∈ J(L). For each
ji ∈ J(L) = {j1, . . . , jm}, let
li = α− |Ki(pi)| ≥ 0.
where
α = max{|Kj(pi)| : j ∈ J(L)}.
Construct the profile ρ consisting of
∑m
i=1 li voters such that there are li
voters approving of ji for each i. That is
ρ =
j1, . . . , j1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l1 times
, j2, . . . , j2︸ ︷︷ ︸
l2 times
, . . . , jm−1, . . . , jm−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
lm−1 times




Since L is a boolean lattice, we have that j||j′ for all j 6= j′ ∈ J(L) and thus
|Kji(ρ)| = li for all ji ∈ J(L).
Now consider the profile piρ. For each j ∈ J(L),
|Kj(piρ)| = |Kj(pi)|+ |Kj(ρ)|
= |Kj(pi)|+ α− |Kj(pi)|
= α.
Thus it follows by cancellation that f(piρ) = 1. Now consider the profile ρpi′. Since
|Kj(pi)| = |Kj(pi′)| for all j ∈ J(L), we have that
|Kj(ρpi′)| = |Kj(ρ)|+ |Kj(pi′)|
= α− |Kj(pi′)|+ |Kj(pi′)|
= α.
Thus it follows by cancellation that f(ρpi′) = 1.
Now notice by consistency we have that
f(piρpi′) = f(pi) ∧ 1 = f(pi)
since f(ρpi′) = 1. Similarly since f(piρ) = 1 we have
f(piρpi′) = 1 ∧ f(pi′) = f(pi′).
Thus by transitivity we have that
f(pi) = f(piρpi′) = f(pi′)
and thus f is non-deviating.
We now state our characterization of the approval voting rule on boolean
lattices as a consequence of Theorem 4.15 and Proposition 4.21.
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Theorem 4.22. The aggregation function f : L∗ → L on a boolean lattice, satisfies
productivity, consistency, faithfulness, and cancellation if and only if f = FA.
Notice that Theorem 4.22 is a lattice analogue of the Alo´s-Ferrer Theorem.
Our goal now is to characterize FA on all boolean lattices with the conditions of
productivity, neutrality, consistency, cancellation, and discerning.
Proposition 4.23. For a boolean lattice L, a function f : L∗ → L satisfying
neutrality and productivity, for any x ∈ L there are three possibilities for f(x).
1) f(x) =
∨
{s ∈ J(L)} = 1
2) f(x) =
∨
{s ∈ J(L) : s 6≤ x} = xc
3) f(x) =
∨
{s ∈ J(L) : s ≤ x} = x.
Proof. Consider the profile pi = (x). Since f(x) 6= 0, there exists an s ∈ J(L) such
that s ≤ f(x). There are two possibilities, either s ≤ x or s 6≤ x.
We first note that since L is boolean we have that j||j′ for all j, j′ ∈ J(L).
Now consider that s ≤ x. Consider s′ ∈ J(L) such that s′ ≤ x, then for the
permutation σ = (s s′), Kt(x) = Kσ(t)(x) for all t ∈ J(L). Hence, by neutrality,
s′ ≤ f(x). Since s′ was chosen arbitrarily, ∨{s ∈ J(L) : s ≤ x} = x ≤ f(pi).
Now consider j ∈ J(L) such that j 6≤ x. A similar argument shows that for
j′ ∈ J(L) such that j′ 6≤ x, j ≤ f(x) if and only if j′ ≤ f(x). Hence if j ≤ f(x)
then f(x) = 1, and if j 6≤ f(x) then f(x) = x.
For the second possibility suppose that s ≤ f(x) such that s 6≤ x. Notice
that x 6= 1. Then it follows by a similar argument that f(x) = ∨{s ∈ J(L) : s 6≤
x} ∈ {xc, 1}.
It follows that for any x ∈ X \ {0} that
f(x) ∈ {x, 1, xc}.
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Proposition 4.24. For a boolean lattice L, if f : L∗ → L satisfies productivitity,
neutrality, consistency, and is discerning then f is faithful.
Proof. Let L be a boolean lattice and let f : L∗ → L satisfy neutrality, consistency,




{s ∈ J(L) : s 6≤ x} = xc, 1}
By way of contradiction suppose f(x) 6= x. Thus it follows that ∨{s ∈ J(L) : s 6≤
x} ≤ f(x).
If |{s ∈ J(L) : s 6≤ x}| = 1 then we have a contradiction to discerning, so
we may assume |{s ∈ J(L) : s 6≤ x}| ≥ 2. Suppose {s ∈ J(L) : s 6≤ x} =
{y, j1, j2, . . . , jk}. Let z ∈ J(L) such that z ≤ x and define a transposition on
J(L) by σi = (z ji) for ji ∈ {j1, . . . , jk} and let σi(x) =
∨{σi(s) : s ≤ x}. Since
Ks(x) = Kσ(s)(σi(x)) for all join irreducibles s ∈ J(L), by neutrality we have that
σ(y) = y ≤ f(σi(x)) for each i and thus by consistency we have
y ≤ f(x) ∧ f(σ1(x)) ∧ · · · ∧ f(σk(x)) = f(piσ1(x) · · ·σk(x)).
Let ρ = piσ1(x) · · · σk(x), and consider that for s ∈ J(L) we have
|Ks(ρ)| =

0 if s = y
1 if s 6≤ x and s 6= y
k + 1 otherwise.
Hence by discerning y 6≤ f(ρ) a contradiction. Hence∨
{s ∈ J(L) : s 6≤ x} 6≤ f(pi)
and thus f(x) = x as was desired.
We now state our final characterization of approval voting for boolean lattices
as a result of Theorem 4.22 and Proposition 4.24.
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Theorem 4.25. The aggregation function f : L∗ → L on a boolean lattice, satisfies
productivity, neutrality, consistency, cancellation, and is discerning if and only if
f = FA.
Now that we have shown the extensions of Theorem 2.12 and Theorem 2.15
to include Boolean Lattices, the question arises: for what classes of distributive
lattices does the result of Theorem 2.12 and Theorem 2.15 extend to? Whereas
Boolean lattices are very natural extensions, we also know that we cannot extend
them to include chains.
We now introduce a new class of distributive lattices. For n ≥ 2, consider








Figure 4.6: C2 × Cn
Conjecture 4.3. The extensions of Theorem 2.12 and Theorem 2.15 hold for the
lattices C2 × Cn for all n ≥ 2.
This conjecture certainly holds for n = 2 since C2 × C2 is a boolean lattice.




In this dissertation we explored the problem of aggregating individual prefer-
ences into a collective preference and under what conditions we are required to select
a collective majority. We studied majority rule on several models of consensus, and
for each model, the conditions varied based on the model.
Starting with the least generalized model, we studied collective approval rules
in which every member of the electorate can approve of whomever they deem best.
The pinnacle result of this section was to characterize majority rule on this model
with the conditions of neutrality, consistency, cancellation, and discerning.
Next we moved to the more general model working with ballot aggregation
rules. In this section we presented the main theorem of this dissertation by char-
acterizing majority rule with the necessary and sufficient conditions of faithfulness,
consistency, and cancellation if and only if the domain is at least 3-rich.
We then concluded the results of this dissertation by working towards ex-
tending some results to a latticial model of consensus.
Whereas Arrow [3] and many others have provided examples to show that
there is no unanimously fair voting rule. In this dissertation we provided many
compelling reasons why one would would select a collective majority. We now
conclude this dissertation by proposing some future work.
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5.1 FUTURE WORK
Here we will discuss some of the current on going projects and potential
future work related to the material in this dissertation. It would be useful to extend
this research to vote aggregation processes other than majority rule as demonstrated
by Gill & Gainous [10].
Throughout this dissertation we have stated several conjectures with some
motivation as to why we believe they are true. In addition to these conjectures
there are three noteworthy projects to be discussed.
5.1.1 PROJECT 1: EXTENDING DUDDY-PIGGINS CONSISTENCY
In 2013, Duddy & Piggins [6] presented a modified version of the consistency
axiom to characterize the class of mean based rules. To not confuse this condition
with the already well established axiom of consistency, we will say that a function
f : N0P(X) → Pne(X) satisfies the axiom of Duddy-Piggins consistency if for all
profiles pi, pi′,
f(pi) ∩ f(pi′) ⊆ f(pipi′) ⊆ f(pi) ∪ f(pi′).
Observe that this axiom has a very natural extension to the model of aggregation
functions on a lattice L. Namely we say that f : L∗ → L satisfies Duddy-Piggins
Consistency if, for any pi, pi′ ∈ L∗,
f(pi) ∧ f(pi′) ≤ f(pipi′) ≤ f(pi) ∨ f(pi′).
We will refer to this axiom as the lattice version of the Duddy-Piggins consistency
axiom.
Using this new consistency axiom, it is our hope to prove a lattice version of
the main result given in [6].
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5.1.2 PROJECT 2: A DIRECT PROOF OF THEOREM 3.15
Consider the following equivalent statement of Theorem 3.15:
Theorem 5.1. A rule f : N0B → Pne(X) defined on any rich ballot space B
satisfies neutrality, consistency, and cancellation if and only if f = FM , f = FM−1
or f = fX .
We want to find a direct proof of Theorem 3.15, instead of relying on the
results of Fishburn.
5.1.3 PROJECT 3: A TRICHOTOMOUS EXTENSION
Following Alcantud [1], one can extend the set model used in Chapter 2 to
allow a voter three possibilities. Namely, a voter can approve, disapprove, or be
indifferent about any given alternative xi belonging to the set X of all possible
alternatives.
If X = {x1, . . . , xm} with m ≥ 2, then let
Π = (N0 × N0 × N0)X .
For any pi ∈ (N0 × N0 × N0)X and for any x ∈ X, pi(x) = (i, j, k) for some i, j, k ∈
N0. We write i as pi+(x), which represents the number of voters who approve of an
alternative x ∈ X. Similarly we will write j as pi−(x), which represents the number
of voters who disapprove of an alternative x. Lastly we will write k as pi0(x), which
represent as the number of voters who are indifferent about an alternative x.
An aggregation function is any function of the form:
f : Π→ Pne(X).
Following [1], Dis&Approval Voting is the aggregation rule WD : Π → Pne(X)
defined by:
WD(pi) = {x ∈ X : pi+(x)− pi−(x) ≥ pi+(y)− pi−(y)) ∀ y ∈ X},
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The goal of this project is to characterize Dis&Approval Voting with axioms similar
to the conditions used in Chapter 2.
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